






COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTER-
RECONNAISSANCE IN THE U.S. ARMY ARMOR




Thesis Advisor: Carl R. Jones





COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTER-
RECONNAISSANCE IN THE U.S. ARMY ARMOR




Thesis Advisor: Carl R. Jones






SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE




2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
:. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000




PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER







1 1 . TITLE (Include Security Classification)
Command and Control Architecture for Reconnaissance and Counterreconnaissance in
the U.S. Army Armor and Mechanized Infantry Task Force
2. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
James B. Henderson









The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
COSATI CODES
SUB-GROUP
SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Command and Control, Reconnaissance, Ground Tactical
Reconnaissance, Army Task Force, Recon, Counterrecon,
Command and Control Architecture, Counterreconnaissance
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse it necessary and identify by block number)
The author presents an analysis of reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance missions
in the U.S. Army armor and mechanized infantry task force. An introduction to
reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance provides background information essential to
the analysis of each mission. The impact of information processing within the task force
and its effect on mission execution is discussed. A systematic approach to mission, or
task, analysis using four task variables (task characteristics, task environment, inter-
unit task interdependence, technology) identifies the uncertainty in the task and the
subsequent impact on information processing. An analysis of reconnaissance and
counterreconnaissance using the four variables reveals the uncertainty in each task and
its effect on the information processing capability of the task force. A unique command
and control architecture is developed for each task which addresses the uncertainty in
the task and facilitates information processing within the task force.
i
!0. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
i X UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED SAME AS RPT. DDTIC USERS
21 . ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified
2a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
Dr. Carl R. Jones




)D Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Command and Control Architecture for Reconnaissance
and Counterreconnaissance in the U.S. Army Armor
and Mechanized Infantry Task Force
by
James B. Henderson
Captain, United States Army
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1981
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY





The author presents an analysis of reconnaissance and counter-
reconnaissance missions in the U.S. Army armor and mechanized
infantry task force. An introduction to reconnaissance and counter-
reconnaissance provides background information essential to the anal-
ysis of each mission. The impact of information processing within the
task force and its effect on mission execution is discussed. A system-
atic approach to mission, or task, analysis using four task variables
(task characteristics, task environment, inter-unit task interdepen-
dence, technology) identifies the uncertainty in the task and the
subsequent impact on information processing. An analysis of recon-
naissance and counterreconnaissance using the four variables reveals
the uncertainty in each task and its effect on the information process-
ing capability of the task force. A unique command and control archi-
tecture is developed for each task which addresses the uncertainty in








D. PRESENTATION SEQUENCE 5
1. Chapter 1 5
2. Chapter II 5
3. Chapter III 6
4. Chapter IV 6
5. Chapter V 7
6. Chapter VI 7




2. The Battle of the Little Bighorn 13






1. Reconnaissance Principles 18
2. Fundamentals of Reconnaissance 19





2 . Counterreconnaissance Techniques 24
E. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE
BATTLEFIELD (IPB) 27
1. Function 1- Battlefield Area Evaluation 28
2 . Function 2— Terrain Analysis 28
3. Function 3- Weather Analysis 29
4. Function 4— Threat Evaluation 29
5. Function 5— Threat Integration 30
F. RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES IN THE TASK FORCE 30
1
.
Intelligence Resources at the Task Force Level 31
2. Supporting Resources 33
G. THE ARMOR AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY TASK
FORCE SCOUT PLATOON 38
1. Introduction 38
2. Organization 39
3. The Ten-Vehicle Scout Platoon 42
H. SUMMARY 45
III. INFORMATION PROCESSING AND TASK ANALYSIS 47
A. INTRODUCTION 47
B. THE TASK FORCE AS AN INFORMATION PROCESSING
SYSTEM 47
C. TASK ANALYSIS 49
1. Task Characteristics 49
2. Task Environment 50
3. Inter-Unit Task Interdependence 52
4. Technology 53
D. SUMMARY 55
IV. STRUCTURING FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL:
COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE FOR
RECONNAISSANCE 58
A. INTRODUCTION 58
B. COORDINATING AND CONTROLLING MECHANISMS 59
C. ELEMENTS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL DESIGN




2. Information Processors 61
3. Individual Positions 61
D. RECONNAISSANCE TASK ANALYSIS 62
1. Reconnaissance Task Characteristics 62
2. Reconnaissance Task Environment 63
VI
3. Inter-Unit Task Interdependence 64
4. Technology 65





2. Headquarters Organization 81
F. SUMMARY 87
V. C2 ARCHITECTURE FOR COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE 90
A. INTRODUCTION 90
B. SCREEN TASK ANALYSIS 91
1. Screen Task Characteristics 92
2. Screen Task Environment 93
3. Inter-Unit Task Interdependence 94
4. Technology 94
C. COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE SCREEN COMMAND
AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE 95
1. Screening Force Organization 96
2. Headquarters Organization 107
D. SUMMARY Ill
VI. CONCLUSION 113
LIST OF REFERENCES 120





Throughout the history of warfare, the battlefield commander has
gone to great lengths to gather as much information about the enemy as
possible. Campaign studies of history's great captains provide the stu-
dent of military art with a deep appreciation of the need for good recon-
naissance. The need for reconnaissance was evident during the battle
between the Macedonians and the Persians along the Granicus River in
333 B.C. Good surveillance of the enemy disposition with respect to the
surrounding terrain enabled Alexander to defeat an enemy vastly supe-
rior in number [Ref. l:p. 24]. This lesson was not lost on the Duke of
Wellington during his campaigns in India and later on the Iberian Penin-
sula. The British were able to overcome the lack of good maps by using
reconnaissance to gather information about the enemy. This led to the
defeat of much larger Indian and French forces during each respective
campaign [Ref. l:pp. 135, 146, 153-154]. It was the lack of good recon-
naissance, notably the absence of Jeb Stuart's cavalry, that blinded
Robert E. Lee during his army's march toward Gettysburg. The corre-
sponding lack of information caused Lee to forfeit the advantage of posi-
tion, so characteristic of the Confederate Army and its commander, and
subsequently experience his most critical defeat of the war [Ref. 2:p. 71].
Reconnaissance, the act of gathering information about enemy
intent, disposition, and capabilities, has long been recognized as the key
element in determining success or failure on the battlefield [Ref. 3:p.
304]. United States Army leaders currently learn many of the same les-
sons about reconnaissance as the great battle captains did. Rotational
exercises at the Army's National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin,
California, serve as a principal training medium by which army leaders
practice and refine the operational principles of tactical warfare. Perhaps
the most glaring lesson that many leaders learn from this outstanding
experience is the importance of reconnaissance to mission accomplish-
ment. Exercise studies consistently show that effective reconnaissance
generally results in mission success, while inadequate reconnaissance
almost always assures failure [Ref. 4:p. 12]. The most prominent trend of
these studies is the inability of the armor and mechanized infantry task
force scout platoon, as it is currently structured, to accomplish the tasks
inherent in reconnaissance. Much of the blame for the scout platoon's
poor performance is based on inadequate organization, equipment, and
training [Ref. 4:pp. 3, 67].
Recognizing the need to improve the reconnaissance capability in the
armor and mechanized infantry task force, the United States Army Armor
School (USAARMS) has recommended several equipment and organiza-
tional changes to the task force scout platoon. Two candidate organiza-
tions for the task force scout platoon were studied during unit rotational
training at the NTC in August 1988. Subsequent analysis of the data
from these exercises may very well determine the ultimate organizational
structure of the scout platoon in the armor and mechanized infantry task
force well into the next century. [Ref. 5:pp. 1, 8]
While restructuring the scout platoon helps to ease the burden it
assumes during the reconnaissance mission, it does not serve as the
ultimate cure for the problems that plague units at the NTC in the area of
reconnaissance. A commander can essentially assign as many elements
of the task force to execute the reconnaissance mission as he sees fit.
This, of course, leads to the problem of balancing the need for informa-
tion with the ability of the task force to employ effective combat power
against the enemy.
The past five years have also seen the advent of counterreconnais-
sance in the task force. Counterreconnaissance is essentially the aggre-
gation of task force actions to deny the enemy information concerning
task force intentions, strength, and location [Ref. 3:p. 94]. Employing
additional combat forces to supplement the intelligence-gathering capa-
bilities of the scout platoon seems to be the accepted norm at the NTC
when dealing with the enemy reconnaissance effort [Ref. 6:p. 10]. This
again poses problems to the task force commander as he attempts to
determine the trade-offs between defeating the enemy reconnaissance
forces and maintaining combat strength in the task force Main Battle
Area (MBA).
B. SYNOPSIS
It is unlikely that successful reconnaissance or counterreconnais-
sance is dependent upon the organization of the scout platoon. Recon-
naissance consists of multiple subtasks, each requiring a unique
structure of personnel, equipment, and command and control coordinat-
ing mechanisms. Counterreconnaissance is inherently less complex than
reconnaissance due to the small number of subtasks that the comman-
der and staff must consider. The low degree of complexity enables the
commander and staff to standardize the organizational structure and
procedures of the task force elements as well as coordinating mecha-
nisms that are essential to counterreconnaissance. The distinctions
between reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance have a significant
impact on how the commander and staff plan and supervise the actions
of the task force for each specific mission.
The need to gather and process information in some quantity, how-
ever, is a principle that is common to both reconnaissance and counter-
reconnaissance. By viewing the task force organization as an information
processing system, the task force commander can analyze reconnais-
sance and counterreconnaissance in terms of the uncertainty that each
represents to the information-processing capability of the unit. The com-
mander's analysis provides the methodology for determining which task
force elements and coordinating mechanisms are appropriate for con-
ducting reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. The process of
matching the elements and coordinating mechanisms to mission or task
uncertainty requires the commander to assume a systematic approach to
structuring the command and control architecture of the task force.
C. PURPOSE
The primary purpose of this thesis is to provide its readers with a
systematic approach toward organizational command and control struc-
tural design. The thesis uses a generic U.S. Army armor and mechanized
infantry task force (a battalion-level force composed of tanks and
mechanized infantry) as a tool for presenting two examples of command
and control architecture— one for reconnaissance and the other for coun-
terreconnaissance. The author presents the principles of task analysis
that are used in determining the degree and type of uncertainty in a
given task or mission. The author also provides several coordinating
mechanisms and organizational elements used within a command and
control structure to minimize the uncertainty associated with the task
and facilitate information processing. The author then justifies the choice
of coordinating mechanisms and task force elements (essentially the
command and control structure) necessary to conduct reconnaissance
and counterreconnaissance using the principles presented in the thesis.
D. PRESENTATION SEQUENCE
The thesis contains six chapters of variable length and scope. Each
subsequent chapter is meant to build on the information provided in the
previous chapters.
1. Chapter I
Chapter I contains the thesis introduction, a synopsis of the
reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance problem that a task force
commander must understand and resolve, the purpose of the thesis, and
the presentation sequence of the thesis.
2. Chapter II
The second chapter provides the reader with the background
information on reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance that is
needed to understand the discussion in the chapters that follow. Chapter
II begins with three historical examples that present the importance of
good reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance to the battlefield com-
mander. The chapter also presents detailed information on the principles,
fundamentals, and techniques that constitute reconnaissance. Similar
information is provided on counterreconnaissance tasks and techniques.
The chapter then provides discussion of the Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlefield (IPB), resources available to the commander to conduct
reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance in the armor and mecha-
nized infantry task force, and a detailed description of the task force
scout platoon organization and capabilities.
3. Chapter III
Chapter III provides the principles that are essential when con-
ducting analysis of a given mission or task. This chapter presents the
command and control structure of the armor and mechanized infantry
task force as an information processing system that gathers raw data,
processes it into useable information, and provides the information to the
commander so that he may effectively direct the combat power of the
task force against an enemy. The task analysis provides a methodology
for identifying and resolving task uncertainty that might exist in the
information processing structure of the task force as the unit executes a
particular mission or task.
4. Chapter IV
Chapter IV contains information on the coordinating mecha-
nisms and organizational elements of design within the task force that
make up the command and control architecture of the unit. A task analy-
sis of the reconnaissance task establishes the degree of associated
uncertainty which the commander must reduce through an effective
command and control structure. The chapter then presents a command
and control structure for reconnaissance that alleviates task-related
uncertainty using the coordinating mechanisms and design elements
provided earlier in the chapter.
5. Chapter V
The fifth chapter does for counterreconnaissance what the
fourth chapter does for reconnaissance. The chapter presents a task
analysis of the principal element of counterreconnaissance— the screen
task. The chapter then supplies the reader with a comprehensive com-
mand and control structure for counterreconnaissance based on the
uncertainty identified in the task analysis. The structure uses the coor-
dinating mechanisms and design elements provided in Chapter IV.
6. Chapter VI
Chapter VI concludes the thesis and provides areas of potential
future study concerning command and control structure for reconnais-
sance and counterreconnaissance within the armor and mechanized
infantry task force.
II. RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
A. INTRODUCTION
Success in battle depends on the commander's ability to understand
the battlefield. The commander must know the area of operations, the
conditions in which forces will fight, and the nature, capabilities, and
activities of the enemy. Avoiding enemy strengths while exploiting their
weaknesses allows the commander to employ surprise and catch the
enemy at a disadvantage as often as possible.
To do this, the commander must have information. Intelligence oper-
ations provide the commander information about the enemy and the area
of operations. Intelligence is the product resulting from collection, evalu-
ation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information
concerning the enemy and the area of operations. This information is
either immediately or potentially significant to military planning and
operations.
Intelligence is the responsibility of all commanders. Intelligence pro-
vides a basis for estimating enemy capabilities, courses of action, and
intentions. The commander uses this information when planning friendly
operations. Intelligence is generally categorized as strategic or tactical.
Strategic intelligence is:
Intelligence that is required for the formulation of policy and military
plans at national and international levels. Oriented on national
objectives, it assists in determining feasible national policies and in
furnishing a basis for planning. Factors which influence the military
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of
nations are considered components of strategic intelligence. [Ref.
7:p. 29]
Tactical intelligence differs from strategic intelligence in terms of
scope and detail. The primary distinction between strategic and tactical
intelligence is in level of application. Units at corps and below usually
generate and use tactical intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publica-
tion 1 (JCS Pub. 1) defines tactical intelligence as "intelligence that is
required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations." [Ref. 3:p.
362] While strategic intelligence contributes to tactical intelligence, local
reconnaissance provides the majority of information necessary to fight
the close and deep operations at the tactical level.
Timely and accurate information provides the tactical commander
the means necessary for understanding the environment and the enemy.
It is with this information that commanders can effectively focus combat
power. The U.S. Army uses tactical reconnaissance operations to produce
accurate and relevant information around which a commander maneu-
vers combat units. JCS Pub. 1 defines reconnaissance as:
A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other
detection methods, information about the enemy; or to secure data
concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic charac-
teristics of a particular area. [Ref. 3:p. 304]
Counterreconnaissance serves as the logical inverse of reconnais-
sance by denying information to the enemy. JCS Pub. 1 defines counter-
reconnaissance as a culmination of "all measures taken to prevent
hostile observation of a force, area, or place." [Ref. 3:p. 94] The success of
reconnaissance or counterreconnaissance is a function of the amount of
information gathered about, or denied to, the enemy.
B. BACKGROUND
The importance of reconnaissance to the commander is apparent to
the student of military warfare. The significance of obtaining or denying
information attests to the success or failure of many battles and cam-
paigns. Today, training exercises conducted at the Army's National Train-
ing Center at Fort Irwin, California confirm the difficult lessons of the
past. Three historical examples provide an understanding of the impor-
tance of reconnaissance or counterreconnaissance to the commander.
1. Agincourt
The Battle of Agincourt is representative of the dire conse-
quences that combat forces face when they lack information about
enemy dispositions and the environment. The climax of Henry Vs inva-
sion of France in 1415, Agincourt was the last great English martial
achievement of the Hundred Years' War|. Henry had intended to march
his army of 5,700 soldiers from the Normandy port of Harfleur to the
English-held fortress at Calais. From here, the army would spend the
winter preparing for the next campaign. Charles d'Albret, Constable of
France, had approximately 25,000 soldiers under arms, 7,000 of which
were mounted knights. Constable d'Albret was intent on cutting off and
destroying Henry Vs army before it could reach Calais and safety.
After much maneuver by both, the morning of the 25th of Octo-
ber found the two unequal armies facing one another across the narrow
and gently rolling plain bounded by the forests of Agincourt and Tram-
court. The French could not have been in a more unfavorable position.
Making no effort to reconnoiter the terrain, the French commanders
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crowded their forces in fields where there was little room for them to
properly deploy or maneuver. Heavy rains had rendered the clay soil
almost impassable to horses bearing the weight of armored knights but
presented no obstacle to the lightly equipped English foot soldier. [Ref.
8:p. 282]
While the French remained on the defensive for several hours,
the English used the time to reconnoiter the surrounding fields and for-
ests. Information from the reconnaissance compelled Henry to position
two columns of archers— one to lie in ambush on the left flank of the
French, the other to his rear. With these elements in place, Henry
ordered his forces forward and occupied a position at which the two for-
ests were no more than 800 meters apart (Figure 1) [Ref. 9:p. 41]. The
French had three lines of battle— the first two on foot and the third
mounted. Deployed across a 1,200-meter front, the dense lines of sol-
diers had little room to maneuver, much less fight. [Ref. 9:pp. 40^2]
The battle opened with French cavalry making disorganized
charges against Henry's flanks. From here, the heavily armored knights
came under a rain of arrows, forcing them to into a narrow front against
the English battle line. Arrow wounds to the horses and the lack of room
to maneuver created a confused mass into which the English knights
attacked. Seizing the opportunity of the moment, the English archers
joined the fight. Those French forces not killed or captured were forced to
flee, trampling through the advancing ranks of their own center. The
defeat was so decisive that the French knights, while still outnumbering





Figure 1 . The Battle of Agincourt
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Henry's use of the terrain to his advantage and the lack of
reconnaissance by the French proved to be the decisive factors in this
battle. By occupying a narrow front, Henry forced the French to assume
an equally narrow front, a maneuver that proved advantageous to the
heavily outnumbered English. The position of the English archers,
unknown to the French, forced the French cavalry into such close quar-
ters that they were unable to raise their weapons to strike a blow. The
condition of the ground provided poor footing for the heavily armored
knights and favored the maneuverability of the English foot soldier. Had
the French conducted proper reconnaissance of the terrain and the
enemy, the Battle of Agincourt might never have been fought under such
disadvantageous conditions. [Ref. 9:p. 41^2]
2. The Battle of the Little Bighorn
Mid-afternoon of 24 June, 1876 found the 7th U.S. Cavalry,
under the command of LTC George Armstrong Custer, at the headwaters
of the Rosebud River, approximately 30 miles from the Little Bighorn.
Custer had been detached from a larger force headed by General Alfred
Terry. Custer's mission was to swing south of a large band of Indians and
prevent their movement to the Bighorn Mountains, while a larger column
under Terry moved north and then down the Bighorn River. This would
entrap the Indians between the two columns, giving them no choice,
short of annihilation, but to surrender. Because maps of the area were
rare and inaccurate, Custer sent out three groups of Indian scouts. One
group occupied a position on a redoubt that provided a commanding view
of the terrain. From here, they were able to locate an immense Indian
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village 15 miles distant. Rather than rest his men and conduct further
reconnaissance, Custer instead chose to move his forces closer to the
village, intending to attack it prior to its possible dispersal. [Ref. 10:pp.
15-16]
Without being sure of the exact size and location of the village,
Custer divided his force into three parts. Three troops under the com-
mand of Major Marcus Reno were to move down a creek and attack the
village from the south. Custer, with five cavalry troops under his imme-
diate command, would move west and then north and attack the village
from its opposite end. The three remaining troops under the command of
Captain Frederick Benteen were to move southwest, with the intent to
cut off any Indian movement in that direction. Continuing to ride north
along the top of the bluffs that overlooked most, but not all, of the Indian
camp, Custer could see that Major Reno had engaged the enemy. Riding
back behind the bluffs until he came to a coulee which led to the Bighorn
River, Custer proceeded down the coulee, thinking he would strike the
village's north end. Custer's force instead hit the village in its middle,
where it was outnumbered by a margin of almost six to one. [Ref.
10:p. 18]
Custer's forces proceeded to fight an orderly withdrawal in order
to occupy some high ground to the rear. Without conducting a recon-
naissance of the area from which he intended to fight until relief arrived
from Reno, Benteen, or Terry, Custer stumbled upon an additional 1,000
Indians led by the war chief Crazy Horse. The resulting fight lasted no
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more than 20 to 30 minutes and ended with the total annihilation of
Custer's five troops. [Ref. 10:pp. 19-20]
Custer made numerous mistakes of an intelligence nature dur-
ing the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Because he did not conduct a recon-
naissance of the objective (the village), Custer had a poor appreciation of
the terrain and the enemy dispositions. Custer's failure to conduct recon-
naissance during the battle left him unaware of Crazy Horse's movement
north to deny him the high ground he desired. Lastly, and most impor-
tant, Custer's lack of information about the enemy size and disposition
led him to incorrectly assume that the Indians would scatter when
attacked by his regiment of some 675 soldiers. This led him to prema-
turely attack a force of approximately 4,500 warriors, the largest concen-
tration ever to assemble in North America.
3. Counterreconnaissance in Vietnam
A technique used by air-mobile forces to defeat enemy recon-
naissance efforts in Vietnam employed a reaction force consisting of three
to five lift helicopters, two to four Cobra gunships, and an infantry pla-
toon on strip alert. When the U.S. forces observed enemy reconnaissance
elements, the reaction force, working as a team, would engage the enemy
by way of an air assault with the Cobras providing fire support. When the
ground element either killed or forced the enemy reconnaissance to with-
draw, the reaction force would return to the airfield and prepare for the
next insertion. This technique provided the commander with intelligence
about enemy reconnaissance efforts, force security against these efforts,
and allowed U.S. forces to retain the initiative. [Ref. 1 l:p. 3]
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The preceding examples provide hard lessons of the importance
of obtaining, or denying, information necessary to support the comman-
der's scheme of maneuver. The Army uses its National Training Center
(NTC) at Fort Irwin, California to confirm the need for timely and effective
reconnaissance operations at the tactical level. In a memorandum pub-
lished as part of the Army's policy of widely disseminating lessons
learned at the NTC, a former commander of the NTC, BG E. S. Leland,
writes:
The importance of reconnaissance cannot be overemphasized. There
is typically a battle which precedes the battle— a confrontation of
opposing reconnaissance units— and the winner of that preliminary
battle is most often the victor in the main event. [Ref. 12:p. 2]
A 1987 RAND study confirms this assessment of the importance
of reconnaissance to mission success. The study encompasses the
results of 113 force-on-force battles. Analysis of the results of reconnais-
sance shows that there is a high correlation between task force success
in the attack and success in the reconnaissance that precedes it. Further
analysis shows that poor reconnaissance almost always leads to mission
failure [Ref. 4:p. 9]. In light of these conclusions, it is apparent that
reconnaissance serves as a combat multiplier because reconnaissance
constitutes a small expenditure of the task force resources.
C. RECONNAISSANCE
Most information needed in combat comes from assets within the
combat force. The commander uses the assets of the task force to per-
form reconnaissance operations in the area of immediate interest. Recon-
naissance is the vital part of the task force intelligence collection effort.
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Reconnaissance is undertaken to collect information by visual or other
detection means.
Fresh information about the enemy and terrain establishes the con-
ditions for success in the offense at the task force level. Reconnaissance
should always precede the commitment of the task force to any course of
action. During offensive operations, the maneuver of the task force
should be based on the concept of "reconnaissance-pull." [Ref. 6:p. 3] At
the task force level, reconnaissance determines the suitability of intended
maneuver routes, the strengths and weaknesses of enemy positions, and
the existence of gaps, and should "puir the task force main body along
the path of least resistance. At the NTC, many commanders attempt to
"push" the strength of the task force along a pre-determined axis of
advance [Ref. 6:p. 3]. This method typically results in the task force
matching its strength against the strength of the defender, resulting in
significant losses for the attacker. With reconnaissance-pull, the task
force reconnaissance effort determines the axis of advance based on the
results of gathered information [Ref. 6:p. 3].
Surveillance is a corollary of reconnaissance that the task force
commander must include in his reconnaissance plan. Department of the
Army Field Manual 34-80 [Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Elec-
tronic Warfare Operations) defines surveillance as:
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface
areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photo-
graphic, or other means. Surveillance is characterized by wide cover-
age of a target area and by repetition. It is normally used to gain
information in those aforementioned areas over a long period of time
to note any changes that may take place. [Ref. 13:p. 4-42]
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The interrelationship of reconnaissance and surveillance permits the
task force commander to commit the same assets to the execution of
reconnaissance and surveillance missions and tasks. The reconnaissance
effort of these assets must revolve around the commander's concept of
operation. The task force commander determines prioritized information
needs, provides operational direction to his staff to assist in reconnais-
sance planning, and then oversees the execution of the reconnaissance
plan.
1. Reconnaissance Principles
Several principles and fundamentals of reconnaissance exist to
assist the commander and his staff in planning reconnaissance opera-
tions. Principles of reconnaissance can assist the commander's thought
process as he determines how and where to focus information collection.
Reconnaissance principles are generally situationally independent and
aid the thought processes of the commander and staff during times of
emotional or physical stress. In his article "Principles of Reconnais-
sance," Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall provides eight principles that
assist in planning reconnaissance operations.
• Information must be timely. At the tactical level timely information
is critical to decision making. The quick tempo of operations at
the task force level requires information timely enough to kill the
enemy before it can gain the advantage. Aspects of information
collection that cause information delays include: multi-layered
bureaucracy, analysis time, environmental constraints, human
error;
• Reconnaissance operations must be aggressive. Aggressive pursuit
of information allows the task force commander to retain the initi-
ative. Aggressive operations are essential against a well equipped
and determined enemy;
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• Reconnaissance operations must be continuous, seeking informa-
tion 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Planning and executing
continuous reconnaissance is essential in retaining initiative.
Technological improvements, especially in the area of maneuver,
ordain continuous reconnaissance operations;
• Reconnaissance operations must focus combat power. Reconnais-
sance operations must "pull" the task force toward enemy weak-
nesses. Reconnaissance operations must gather information
critical to the commander's intent by focusing on the enemy's
center of gravity;
• Commanders need relevant information to make good decisions.
Relevant information is both accurate and reliable and should
conform to the reality of the situation;
• The most effective reconnaissance operations are secret. Recon-
naissance forces must be able to operate under the protection and
advantage of secrecy, or stealth. Secrecy in reconnaissance opera-
tions enables the commander to anticipate and manipulate the
enemy commander. Conducting reconnaissance operations with-
out regard for secrecy results in a forfeiture of any advantage that
surprise offers;
• Reconnaissance operations must provide accurate information.
Reconnaissance assets must provide information that is free of
distortion. Collection assets must be the task force's "eyes and
ears" and not its brain. Information collectors must be aware of
technological, natural, and human factors that distort informa-
tion; and
• Reconnaissance operations must be complementary. Balancing
the capabilities of reconnaissance assets is key to successful
information gathering. The systems available to conduct recon-
naissance must complement their respective strengths and weak-
nesses. Redundant information collection assets help reduce the
potential for deception or system breakdowns. Asset limitations
require task force commanders to balance the need for
"completely" accurate information against timely information. [Ref.
14:pp. 10-13]
2. Fundamentals of Reconnaissance
Department of the Army Field Manual 17-98 {Scout Platoon)
provides the armor and mechanized infantry scout platoon with six
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fundamentals of reconnaissance, some of which are similar to the princi-
ples that LTC Hall presents. The six fundamentals of reconnaissance
assist leaders at all levels during the planning and execution of recon-
naissance missions.
• Use maximum reconnaissance forward. Keep the scouts forward
where they can effectively accomplish their reconnaissance
missions;
• Orient on the reconnaissance objective. The scheme of maneuver
for reconnaissance assets should focus on a specific objective;
• Report all information rapidly and accurately [This fundamental is
similar to LTC Hall's first and seventh principles];
• Retain freedom to maneuver. Task force scouts must be able to
maneuver in the area of operations to accomplish the mission.
This is especially true once the scouts make contact with the
enemy. Rapid tactical developments at the task force level require
scouts to retain the initiative to maneuver on the battlefield;
• Gain and maintain enemy contact. Once the scouts find the
enemy, they must maintain contact using all available means
unless the commander orders them to do otherwise; and
• Develop the situation rapidly. The dangers associated with locat-
ing the enemy require the task force scouts to assess situations as
rapidly as possible. The scout platoon must integrate stealth and
training in order to accomplish reconnaissance missions with
minimal loss of assets. [Ref. 15:pp. 3-2 to 3-3]
The fundamentals of reconnaissance provide a commander and
staff with guidelines that assist in planning, allocating resources for, and
executing reconnaissance missions. Like reconnaissance principles, they
are situationally independent and are applicable to variations in enemy,
terrain, assets available, and reconnaissance mission.
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3. Reconnaissance Techniques
Information-gathering elements employ reconnaissance tech-
niques that achieve a balance between the level of risk and the security
necessary to ensure mission accomplishment. Training and rehearsals
are necessary to reduce the vulnerability of reconnaissance assets on the
battlefield. Reconnaissance techniques provide a balance between the
need for stealth and aggressiveness when performing reconnaissance.
Reconnaissance forces employ the appropriate technique based on expe-
rience, professional judgement, time available, and the mission to be per-
formed. There are three basic techniques that reconnaissance elements
employ to gather information against the enemy or about the area of
operations.
• Mounted reconnaissance. Reconnaissance forces conduct mounted
reconnaissance when time is limited and detailed reconnaissance is
not required. Mounted reconnaissance allows reconnaissance forces
to maintain the fast tempo of combat operations. Mounted recon-
naissance is predicated on known enemy locations and the absence
of extensive obstacle systems;
• Dismounted reconnaissance. Reconnaissance forces conduct dis-
mounted reconnaissance to obtain detailed information about ter-
rain features, obstacles, or enemy forces. Since time is generally not
limited, reconnaissance forces can employ stealth due to the expec-
tation of enemy contact. Forces conduct dismounted reconnaissance
when terrain restricts the movement of tracked or wheeled vehicles;
and
• Reconnaissance by fire. Reconnaissance assets use direct or indirect
fires on suspected enemy positions to cause the enemy to disclose
its presence by movement or by returning fire. Forces use this
method when enemy contact is expected and time is limited, or when
they cannot use maneuver to develop the situation. This method
eliminates the advantage of stealth and is generally not effective
against disciplined troops. [Ref. 15:pp. 3-18 to 3-20]
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D. COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
Counterreconnaissance is the aggregate of task force actions taken
to counter the enemy reconnaissance effort in the area of operations.
Counterreconnaissance is both passive and active in that enemy recon-
naissance forces must be detected and denied information or destroyed
before they can report their observations [Ref. 6:p. 10]. Much like recon-
naissance, counterreconnaissance must be continuous over time and
throughout the depth of the battlefield.
Because enemy reconnaissance operations will begin well ahead of
any planned tactical operation, the task force must plan counterrecon-
naissance so as to use all assets available to detect the enemy early. A
successful counterreconnaissance plan requires early coordination, thor-
ough rehearsal, and comprehensive staff control. The task force must
complete several planning steps in order to ensure that sufficient assets
and appropriate techniques are employed against the enemy reconnais-
sance effort.
1. Counterreconnaissance Planning
Counterreconnaissance planning requires the participation of
the commander and the entire task force staff. The commander and the
staff work to ensure that the counterreconnaissance actions of the task
force are synchronized, mutually supporting, and sufficient to counter
the enemy reconnaissance effort. The task force commander and staff
should perform the following tasks to ensure that the enemy reconnais-
sance elements are detected early. [Ref. 16:p. 4-47]
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a. Specify the Security Force Mission
The method and means to provide early warning, detection,
neutralization, and destruction of enemy reconnaissance elements
should be specified by the commander and his staff. The commander
must provide his operational intent to the security force commander(s)
prior to the deployment of those forces. It is essential that every soldier in
the task force know the commander's intent for counterreconnaissance.
b. Provide Sufficient Assets
While counterreconnaissance is essentially a responsibility
of the entire task force, the unit should have a screening force to detect
the enemy's approach and defeat the enemy's reconnaissance efforts.
According to Department of the Army Field Manual 101-5-1 [Operational
Terms and Symbols), a screening force:
Maintains surveillance, provides early warning to the main body,
impedes and harasses the enemy with supporting indirect fires, and
destroys enemy reconnaissance within its capability. [Ref. 17:p. 43]
The screening force requires a minimum of two elements— a
force dedicated to acquire enemy reconnaissance elements and a force to
close with and destroy enemy reconnaissance [Ref. 6:p. 11].
A forward security force provides greater resistance against
enemy reconnaissance by preventing enemy observation of the task force
activities and dispositions. The forward security force also provides
deception by creating a false picture of the task force dispositions. [Ref.
6:p. 11]
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c. Establish Security Early and Well Forward
The screening force should be in place before the task
force's company teams move into their battle positions and before work
on obstacles begins [Ref. 16:p. 4-47]. The force must be far enough for-
ward (about three to five kilometers forward of task force defensive posi-
tions and obstacles) to prevent enemy observation of defensive
preparations [Ref. 6:p. 11].
d. Put Security in the Right Place; Ensure Complete
Coverage
The task force S-2 recommends to the operations officer
(S-3) the general location of the counterreconnaissance force based on
his terrain and threat analysis. The task force commander approves the
plan and provides the commanders of elements within the screening
force with his intent of how to defeat the enemy reconnaissance effort.
Each element commander adjusts the plan to the terrain to ensure
complete coverage. [Ref. 16:p. 4-48]
The task force commander should include in his intent the
exact responsibility of each company team in the overall counterrecon-
naissance plan. The actions taken by the company teams in the event of
enemy penetration of the security element provide the depth required of a
good counterreconnaissance plan.
2. Counterreconnaissance Techniques
Relying on the task force's company teams to provide their own
local security and on the scout platoon to acquire and destroy the
enemy's mounted reconnaissance often results in gaps in the coverage
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through which the enemy will penetrate. Efficient use of available assets
in a well-coordinated plan ensures that the enemy reconnaissance will
encounter severe difficulties as they attempt to penetrate the defense.
While there is no set doctrine to ensure success, there are several tech-
niques available to counter the enemy reconnaissance effort. [Ref.
18:pp. 1-2]
a. Attach a Thermal Sight Equipped Tank Platoon to the
Scouts and Place It Forward
The scouts acquire enemy reconnaissance forces and alert
the tank platoon. The tank platoon responds to the sighting by intercept-
ing and destroying the enemy scouts. This option requires in-depth coor-
dination between the tank platoon leader, S-2, S-3, and scout platoon
leader. It also requires a communications net on which the tank platoon
leader, scout platoon leader, and S-2 can operate in order to facilitate
rapid instructions and information passing.
b. Use the Scout Platoon to Acquire and Destroy Enemy
Reconnaissance Elements
Under the present table of organization and equipment
(TOE), the scout platoon in the armor and mechanized infantry task force
has the firepower to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements (six M3
Cavalry Fighting Vehicles, each equipped with a 25 millimeter cannon
and the TOW Antitank Missile System). The limited number of vehicles to
conduct a screen causes the platoon to be spread too thin and creates
gaps that are susceptible to enemy penetration. Distinct signature of the
weapon systems compromise the scout's observation post locations.
Scouts that fight lose their ability to observe their area of responsibility,
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enabling the enemy to penetrate with other elements. Using this tech-
nique, the task force commander runs the risk of losing his most valua-
ble reconnaissance asset. This technique does allow the task force com-
mander to retain maximum combat forces in the main defensive area.
c. Designate a Company Team to Provide a Reaction
Force
This technique requires close and continuous coordination
between the company team and the scout platoon leader. Allowing the
enemy to penetrate the forward screen creates the possibility of losing
the enemy reconnaissance element between the time it is sighted and the
time the reaction force can move to intercept. Multiple simultaneous
penetrations by the enemy could create additional problems for the reac-
tion force, most specifically fratricide.
d. Designate "No Movement Areas" for Company Team
Battle Positions
Company teams are responsible for covering "no movement
areas" by direct fire. The company team engages any element within the
boundaries of the "no movement area." This technique requires extensive
coordination and increases the possibility of fratricide. Area boundaries
must be clearly visible and well marked. This technique enables the task
force to retain maximum combat power in the main battle area.
e. Use a Company Team in a Forward Screen Role
This technique provides a strong counterreconnaissance
capability, gives a measure of deception, and facilitates early engage-
ment. A company team has the assets to deal with dismounted enemy
reconnaissance elements, as well [Ref. 6:p. 12]. The company team
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withdraws at the direction of the task force commander to its primary
battle position to fight the main battle.
The techniques of counterreconnaissance offer the task
force commander and staff several options for the organization of assets
and conceptual development necessary to defeat the enemy reconnais-
sance effort. Counterreconnaissance techniques are flexible to the needs
and constraints of the task force and the area of operations. Staff analy-
sis and planning must take these factors into consideration when plan-
ning for reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. The Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield provides the tool to conduct required anal-
ysis and planning.
E. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is an integral part of the
task force command and control process. IPB is the factor that allows the
task force to react quicker than the enemy. FM 34-80 defines IPB as "the
continuous and systematic process of evaluating the enemy, weather,
and terrain for a specific battlefield area." [Ref. 13:p. 4-11] IPB allows the
staff to plan for missions based on analysis of the enemy and friendly
situations and the area of operations.
The task force S-2 is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and
reporting the information essential to the IPB process. IPB provides the
basis for all intelligence operations, tactical decisions, and tactical oper-
ations. The task force staff uses IPB information to develop the operation
plan, the collection plan, and the reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
IPB integrates threat doctrine with the terrain and weather to determine
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and evaluate enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of
action. The staff uses IPB to confirm their initial estimates of the area of
operations and the enemy.
Department of the Army Field Manual 71-2 [The Tank and Mecha-
nized Infantry Battalion Task Force) lists five functions of the IPB process.
The functions of the IPB provide the task force S-2 a systematic approach
for information analysis.
1. Function 1— Battlefield Area Evaluation
The commander and S-2 together view the present and future
area of operations and interest in four dimensions: width, depth, height,
and time. The S-2 can then assemble the information and materials
needed to continue the IPB process. The S-2 requests information on
normal climatic, weather, and area studies from the brigade S-2. The S-2
assembles the maps required to give complete coverage of the task force
area of operations and interest. [Ref. 16:p. 2-23]
2. Function 2—Terrain Analysis
The S-2 identifies the effects of terrain on combat operations.
The S-2 relies on the brigade S-2 to provide terrain factor overlays to
perform IPB. In the absence of such overlays, the S-2 conducts the anal-
ysis with assistance from the task force engineer. Terrain is analyzed
using the five military aspects of terrain: observation and fields of fire,
cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach.
Because of the effect that weather can have on terrain, the S-2 conducts
terrain analysis concurrently with weather analysis. [Ref. 16:p. 2-23]
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3. Function 3—Weather Analysis
Weather conditions can significantly affect the mobility require-
ments for ground operations. The five military aspects of the weather that
concern intelligence support to operation planning are: temperature and
humidity, precipitation, winds, clouds, and visibility. The S-2 integrates
the terrain data with the weather data to provide an assessment of the
area and its effect on operations. [Ref. 16:p. 2-24]
4. Function 4—Threat Evaluation
The S-2's IPB threat evaluation consists of available enemy








• Combat Effectiveness. [Ref. 16:p. 2-25]
When this information is not available, the S-2 uses a generic
doctrinal template as the threat evaluation tool. The doctrinal template
displays enemy composition, formation, frontages, and depths. The tem-
plate depicts enemy doctrinal deployment for various types of operations.
[Ref. 16:p. 2-25]
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5. Function 5—Threat Integration
The S-2 relates the threat evaluation to the terrain and weather
to predict how the enemy will maneuver in the area of operations. Situa-
tion, event, and decision support templates assist in the development of
threat integration. The S-2 uses the templates to identify enemy courses
of action, reaction to events, and possible threat activities. Estimating the
enemy's actions and intentions provide the S-2 with the answers to the
questions where to look, what to look for, and when to look. [Ref.
16:p. 2-27]
IPB provides a tool for systematic analysis of the enemy,
weather, and terrain to determine enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and
probable courses of action. IPB enables the S-2 to determine how and
where to position reconnaissance and surveillance assets in order to con-
firm the estimates made during the process.
F. RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES IN THE TASK FORCE
The resources available to conduct reconnaissance typically deter-
mine the reconnaissance mission type. Human intelligence (HUMINT),
imagery intelligence (IMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) support
current or planned operations for collecting specific, detailed information
at a particular time and location. Resource systems generally classify
reconnaissance into three categories: ground tactical reconnaissance,
reconnaissance of the electromagnetic spectrum, and aerial
reconnaissance.
The limited assets organic to or supporting a task force restrict the
task force primarily to the conduct of ground tactical reconnaissance.
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The types of systems available to the task force commander assist in fur-
ther defining the type of reconnaissance and the techniques necessary to
accomplish it.
1. Intelligence Resources at the Task Force Level
The principal information-gathering resources available to the
task force include its organic scout platoon and subordinate maneuver
companies. The task force uses patrols, observation posts, and individual
soldiers to collect and report information about the enemy, terrain, and
weather. [Ref. 13:pp. 2-2 to 2-3]
a. Individual Soldiers
Individual soldiers provide the task force commander and
staff with the majority of timely combat information. Individual soldiers
observe and report real-time information concerning enemy equipment,
patrols, reconnaissance, activities, and dispositions.
b. Observation Posts
The task force establishes observation posts (OPs) to
observe and listen to enemy activity within particular sectors. Communi-
cation between the task force and each observation post is essential.
Ground surveillance radars, remote sensors, and observation devices
(day and night) may augment observation posts.
c. Patrols
The task force conducts patrols prior to and during opera-
tions for reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and security. There are
two types of patrols: reconnaissance and combat. Reconnaissance patrols
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collect information and confirm or disprove the accuracy of previous
information. The three types of reconnaissance patrols are:
• Route reconnaissance. Route reconnaissance patrols obtain informa-
tion about the enemy and any dominating terrain along a specific
route [Ref. 15:p. 3-32];
• Zone reconnaissance. Zone reconnaissance collects information
about the enemy and terrain between specific boundaries. This is
typically the most time- and resource-consuming of the three types
of reconnaissance patrols [Ref. 15:p. 3-39]; and
• Area reconnaissance. Area reconnaissance collects information
about the enemy and terrain within a defined geographical area that
is critical to the operation [Ref. 15:p. 3-44].
The task force uses combat patrols during reconnaissance
and counterreconnaissance as well as to provide security to the task
force main body. The primary mission of a combat patrol is to harass,
destroy, or capture the enemy with collection of combat information rele-
gated to a secondary mission [Ref. 13:p. 2-3]. Captured enemy soldiers
and documents provide information about the enemy that cannot be
obtained by observation alone.
d. Maneuver Companies
The maneuver companies of the task force contain
resources that facilitate the collection of information. Weapons systems
provide enhanced optics for observation, while combat vehicles afford a
means for mounted patrols. The unit's individual soldiers occupy obser-
vation posts and conduct patrols to gather information about the enemy
and terrain in the immediate area.
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e. Scout Platoon
As the primary information-gathering asset, the scout pla-
toon provides reconnaissance and security for the task force. Through
reconnaissance, the scout platoon assists in the movement of the task
force and its subordinate elements. During movement, the scout platoon
often "screens" a flank, the front, or the rear of the task force, providing
early warning in the event of enemy contact. The scout platoon serves as
"the commander's eyes and ears on the battlefield" by providing current
battlefield information to the commander to assist in the planning and
execution of the mission. [Ref. 15:p. 1-1]
2. Supporting Resources
Field artillery, military intelligence, Army aviation, tactical air
forces, air defense artillery, combat engineers, and various combat ser-
vice support units provide the task force commander with supplementary
means and resources to satisfy his information requirements [Ref. 13:p.
2-4]. The extent of information that each provides is based on the avail-
ability of each asset to the task force.
a. Field Artillery
The task force receives a Fire Support Section (FSS) from
the brigade direct support field artillery battalion. The mission of the FSS
is to assist in the planning, directing, and coordinating of all fire support
operations [Ref. 13:p. 2-4]. The FSS provides each maneuver company of
the task force with a Fire Support Team (FIST) that supports the com-
pany in much the same manner as the FSS does at task force level. In
the armor and mechanized infantry task force, the FIST acts as the basis
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for the artillery's target acquisition effort. The company Fire Support Offi-
cer (FSO) acts as the liaison between the maneuver company and the
direct support field artillery firing batteries. Forward observers from the
FIST often accompany reconnaissance patrols and assist in manning
observation posts. [Ref. 13:p. 2-5]
The FIST is suitably equipped to assist in gathering and
communicating information about the enemy and terrain. Each FIST is
equipped with a Digital Message Device (DMD) that is capable of sending
and receiving digitally transmitted messages using existing FM radios.
The FIST vehicle (FISTV) integrator, the ground laser designator-range
finder, the AN/GVS-5 hand-held laser range finder, the DMD, and the
night observation devices on the FISTV enhance the capability of the
FIST to provide real-time combat information to the task force.
b. Military Intelligence
The division military intelligence battalion typically pro-
vides the task force with a Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) squad. The
GSRs provide the task force with a mobile, near-all-weather, 24-hour
capability for battlefield surveillance. The task force may employ GSRs on
patrols and at observation posts. Operating ranges for the radars are
shown in Table 1 [Ref. 13:p. 2-8].
Both radars can detect targets and provide more accurate
distance and directional data than is possible by visual estimate, espe-
cially under conditions of darkness or poor visibility [Ref. 13:p. 2-9]. GSR
can also guide mounted or dismounted patrols during periods of reduced









Remote sensors (REMS) within the MI battalion provide a
near-all-weather, day-and-night surveillance system. The system can
function independently of, or supplement, other reconnaissance and sur-
veillance systems. Scouts, maneuver companies, reconnaissance patrols,
or sensor teams are capable of emplacing REMS. REMS provide the
following advantages to the task force reconnaissance operation: timeli-
ness, all-weather capability, continuous operation without regard to
visibility or fatigue, and suitability for employment in high-risk
environments. [Ref. 13:p. 2-10]
c. Army Aviation
Division and corps army aviation assets provide the task
force commander with responsive and mobile means to find and fix
enemy forces. While the majority of these elements remain under the
operational control of their parent organization, the task force comman-
der and staff must integrate their capabilities into the reconnaissance
plan should the asset become available. Aviation assets are capable of
conducting reconnaissance, surveillance, and security and screening
missions. Aviation assets provide the commander the ability to insert
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reconnaissance patrols deep into enemy territory. The commander can
use aviation to emplace REMS aerially into areas that are inaccessible to
ground units, to speed emplacement, or to increase the number of sen-
sors that can be emplaced prior to a mission. [Ref. 13:pp. 2-10 and 2-12]
d. Tactical Air Force
The Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) is a combination of Army
rotary aircraft and Air Force close air support (CAS) aircraft that operates
with ground maneuver forces at the brigade and task force level. Plan-
ning JAAT missions is essential if the full potential of the air-ground
combat team is to be realized. Air reconnaissance reports, in-flight com-
bat information reports, and air situation reports provide the task force
commander with near-real-time information. The Air Force liaison officer
(ALO) from the attached tactical air control party (TACP) acts as the staff
representative for coordinating and planning JAAT missions at the task
force level. IRef. 13:p. 2-12]
e. Air Defense Artillery (ADA)
Short-range air defense (SHORAD) assets support the task
force during combat operations. SHORAD elements often consist of a
Vulcan or Chaparral squad, or a Stinger team or section. Forward area
alerting radar and target alert data display set (FAAR/TADDS) systems
provide the task force with air alert warning information. Early dissemi-
nation of possible air-ground attack or air assault operations from the
area-wide ADA command and control system provides the commander




The task force receives a combat engineer platoon from the
brigade direct support engineer company. While the mission of the com-
bat engineer platoon is not directly related to intelligence gathering, the
combat information provided by individual soldiers, engineer reconnais-
sance, or terrain data expressly supports the mission of the armor and
mechanized infantry task force [Ref. 13:p. 2-15]. Combat engineer sup-
port provides information on trafficability of intended routes, accessibility
to key terrain, and disposition of enemy obstacles and fortifications.
Combat engineers often accompany the task force scout platoon during
reconnaissance missions. This allows the scouts to continue their recon-
naissance while engineers conduct obstacle reconnaissance and breach-
ing operations.
g. Combat Service Support
Combat service support (CSS) assets do not have an infor-
mation gathering role beyond that of the individual soldier. The staff,
particularly the task force intelligence officer (S-2), must consider and
plan for the evacuation of captured enemy soldiers, documents, and
equipment. CSS elements provide transportation and security assets for
the rapid evacuation of captured material and personnel. [Ref.
13:p. 2-15]
The maneuver task force's organic and supporting assets
are capable of supplying the task force commander with a vast amount of
information about close-in enemy forces. Even though supporting assets
are limited in availability and number, the task force commander and
37
staff must develop and maintain contingency plans in the event that they
become available. The commander must therefore rely primarily on the
organic elements of the task force for information gathering. The tactical
mission and capabilities of organic assets often determine the reconnais-
sance technique that they employ.
G. THE ARMOR AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY TASK FORCE
SCOUT PLATOON
1. Introduction
The scout platoon is organized, equipped, and trained to con-
duct reconnaissance and security for the task force. The platoon operates
as part of the task force and should be assigned missions that capitalize
on its reconnaissance capabilities. Scout effectiveness is a product of the
scout's ability to provide meaningful intelligence to the task force.
The scout platoon remains an effective information-gathering
asset so long as it employs stealth. Successful scout platoons obtain the
majority of detailed combat information through stealthy dismounted
patrolling and stationary observation [Ref. 6:p. 9]. A 1987 RAND study on
tactical reconnaissance shows that scouts avoid losses through stealth
and avoiding the enemy during reconnaissance. Even though the scout's
reconnaissance vehicle, the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV), contains
two formidable weapon systems, the study shows a high mortality rate
against opposing forces (OPFOR) security forces [Ref. 4:p. 61]. Scouts
mounted on the M3 CFV have a tendency to initiate direct fire engage-
ments and thus compromise their location to the enemy. The data con-
tained in the RAND study shows the importance of avoiding the enemy
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during reconnaissance [Ref. 4:p. 61]. When engaged by an enemy, scouts
should immediately return a high volume of suppressive fire in the ene-
my's general direction, and then move as fast as possible to covered ter-
rain. Scouts should use firepower only to restore their ability to conduct
reconnaissance.
2. Organization
The scout platoon of the armor and mechanized infantry task
force consists of an officer (first lieutenant) and 29 enlisted soldiers. The
platoon is organized into a platoon headquarters and two scout sections.
The platoon headquarters provides command and control for the scout
platoon and consists of the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant, and
their respective vehicle crews. The scout section consists of a section
leader, a squad leader, and their crews manning two CFVs. Figure 2
depicts the organization of the scout platoon. [Ref. 15:p. 1-1 to 1-2]
Because the scout platoon is a small unit with a very large mis-
sion, the organization does not seem to provide the assets needed to con-
duct effective reconnaissance. In 1986, a United States Army Training
Board White Paper concluded that:
The scout platoon organization itself is flawed. Task force reconnais-
sance capability is severely affected by the current scout platoon
organization and equipment. Commanders across the board agree
that a six vehicle platoon is inadequate to cover the task force front.
[Ref. 20:p. 2]
The study also addresses the problems that the CFV presents
during the execution of the reconnaissance mission [Ref. 20:p. 2]. An







1 LT (Platoon Leader) R
1 SGT 19D20 (Gunner) R
1 SP4 19D10 (Scout Driver) P
1 SP4 19D10 (Scout) R
1 PFC 19D10 (Scout) R, GL
1 SFC 19D40 (Platoon Sergeant) R
1 SGT 19D20 (Gunner) R
1 SP4 19D10 (Scout Driver) P
1 SP4 19D10 (Scout) R
1 PFC 19D10 (Scout) R, GL
SCOUT SECTIONS
VEHICLES 2 AND 5
Section Leaders
VEHICLES 3 AND 6
Squad Leaders
1 SSG 19D30 (Section Leader) R
1 SGT 19D20 (Gunner) R
1 SP4 19D10 (Scout Driver) P
1 SP4 19D10 (Scout) R
1 PFC 19D10 (Scout) R, GL
1 SSG 19D30 (Squad Leader) R
1 SGT 19D20 (Gunner) R ».
1 SP4 19D10 (Scout Driver) P
1 SP4 19D10 (Scout) R
1 PFC 19D10 (Scout) R, GL
LEGEND: R = Rifle
P = Pistol
GL = Grenade Launcher
Figure 2. Scout Platoon Organization
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a 1987 study of reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance operations
in the heavy brigade and task force. The study concluded that:
The M3 is unsatisfactory for use as a reconnaissance vehicle. The
large profile, height, and noise it generates makes it impossible for
scouts to move stealthily across the battlefield. [Ref. 6:p. 16]
The crew required to operate the M3 CFV contributes to the ina-
bility of the scout platoon to adequately conduct its missions. The study
further states that:
With the introduction of the M3 came a reduction in the number of
scouts available in each squad to perform dismounted reconnais-
sance and surveillance operations. Although authorized five, scout
squads in the active force usually muster three or four men in each
squad. The M3 requires three men to operate the vehicle effectively,
usually leaving only one scout to dismount. Given this limitation,
the tendency is for scouts to remained mounted. [Ref. 6:p. 16]
In 1988 three units experimented with the size and equipment
of the scout platoon while conducting training exercises at the National
Training Center. All three units used some mix of the High Mobility Mul-
tiple Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) in lieu of the M3 CFV, with one task
force increasing the size of the scout platoon to eight vehicles. In all three
cases, the scouts mounted in HMMWVs were able to successfully pene-
trate the enemy security element and provide essential intelligence to the
task force [Refs. 21 and 22]. Improvements in stealth, fuel consumption,
and time required to conduct logistical resupply were noted.
The effectiveness of the HMMWV as a reconnaissance vehicle
has led the Army to explore the possibility of reconfiguring the task force
scout platoon.
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3. The Ten-Vehicle Scout Platoon
Over the past ten months, the Armor School and the 24th
Infantry Division have participated in a concept and evaluation plan
(CEP) to reconfigure the armor and mechanized infantry scout platoon.
The Armor School has developed two candidate organizations: (1) a pla-
toon of four M3 CFVs, six HMMWVs, and four military motorcycles; and
(2) a HMMWV platoon of ten HMMWVs and four motorcycles (Figures 3
and 4) [Ref. 23:pp. 8 and 10]. All HMMWVs mount either an AN/TAS-4 or
AN/TAS-6 long-range thermal sight, and either the MK19 grenade
launcher or an M60 machine gun. Four STINGER missiles are organic to
the platoon for defense primarily against helicopter gunships. Individual
optical devices have been doubled to increase surveillance capability. Pro-
visions for the use of the GVS-5 laser rangefinder have been made but
not yet tested. [Ref. 5:p. 5]
In August 1989, two task forces from the 24th Infantry Division
participated in focused rotational training exercises at the NTC. Each
task force was configured to one of the two candidate organizations. Both
task force scout platoons were scrutinized by subject-matter experts.
The performance of both scout platoons demonstrated that the
ten-vehicle/four-motorcycle platoon increases the reconnaissance and
security capability of the task force [Ref. 5:p. 13]. The ten-vehicle scout
platoon can operate more observation posts, cover a wider front, perform
a larger number of simple reconnaissance missions, and provide more
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Figure 4. Ten-Vehicle Scout Platoon, All HMMWV
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vehicles make the ten-vehicle scout platoon more stealthy than the
current platoon [Ref. 5:p. 16]. Motorcycles add mobility, speed, and
maneuverability to the scout platoon. Motorcycle scouts provide the task
force commander with an asset that can conduct long-range reconnais-
sance in a relatively short amount of time [Ref. 24:p. 33].
H. SUMMARY
The need for information about the enemy has been evident since
the dawn of warfare. Information assists the commander in projecting his
forces in a coherent and calculated manner. While a commanders staff
has the capability to conduct estimates based on doctrinal and situa-
tional templating, the commander must have accurate and timely infor-
mation on which to base his tactical decisions. The ten-vehicle scout
platoon provides the armor and mechanized infantry task force comman-
der a significantly improved means for collecting information about the
enemy.
Denying the enemy information through counterreconnaissance is
just as important as gaining it. By prohibiting the entry of enemy recon-
naissance into the task force area of operations, the task force comman-
der disrupts the enemy commander's decision cycle. The commander has
several options through which to defeat the enemy reconnaissance effort.
While a commander may have the physical assets to accomplish the
reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance missions, he must be able to
effectively direct and control them. The unit must have a structure that
affects the command and control of these elements. Both commander
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and staff must recognize the factors and parameters inherent to this
structure.
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III. INFORMATION PROCESSING AND TASK ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The structure of armor and mechanized infantry task force com-
mand and control must be adaptable to the characteristics of certain
variables that exist inside and outside the task force. Identification of
these variables enables the commander to determine the most effective
command and control structure for a particular situation. The comman-
der's need for information in decision making mandates a command and
control structure that facilitates information gathering and processing.
The commander and staff must therefore be cognizant of the variables
that are applicable when structuring the task force for reconnaissance
or, in the case of denying information to the enemy,
counterreconnaissance
.
B. THE TASK FORCE AS AN INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEM
Information processing is ideally the "gathering, interpreting, and
synthesis of information in the context of organizational decision mak-
ing." [Ref. 25 :p. 614] Information processing in the task force consists of
the functions, relations, and operations that exist in order to minimize
uncertainty about a particular situation. The structure of the task force
command and control system affects its ability to effectively process
information and deal with uncertainty.
The armor and mechanized infantry task force is essentially an orga-
nizational information processing system. Task force elements gather
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information based on a particular mission or situation and then process
and disseminate the information throughout the task force, and the com-
mander uses the information to direct the combat power of the task
force. An essential feature of organizational information processing is the
need to share information among the commander's staff so that they may
arrive at a similar interpretation of the information [Ref. 26:p. 556]. This
facilitates the synchronization required for the command and control of
the task force.
Another feature of the task force as an information-processing sys-
tem is the requirement for a division of labor among the elements of the
task force in order to accomplish a mission or task [Ref. 26:p. 556]. Divi-
sion of labor is synonymous with coordination of the various elements of
the task force (scouts, tank/infantry companies, GSRs, staff sections,
etc.) based on their respective weapon systems, personnel, equipment,
and inherent missions. In order for the task force to accomplish its mis-
sion, each element must perform its own mission or task while coordinat-
ing the task with other elements as necessary.
The activities of the task force elements join together in order to best
deal with uncertainty and increase information processing. The structure
of the task force elements to conduct reconnaissance missions must
facilitate the collection, as well as the processing, of information within
the task force. Task force counterreconnaissance force structure must
also provide information processing while supplying the means to disrupt
the enemy commander's own information processing system by denying
or defeating his reconnaissance efforts. The design of structural relations
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within the task force must be capable of dealing with its information-
processing requirements during task execution.
C. TASK ANALYSIS
The critical task of the armor and mechanized infantry task force is
to facilitate the collection, gathering, and processing of information about
how different elements of the task force are functioning, each element's
effect on the success of the mission, and conditions external to the task
force itself. Any task for which the task force is responsible, however,
varies in the degree of uncertainty associated with it [Ref. 27:p. 56].
Recognized simply as the absence of information, a more suitable
definition of uncertainty is "the difference between the amount of infor-
mation required to perform a task and the amount of information already
possessed by the organization." [Ref. 26:p. 556] It is up to the comman-
der and his staff to build the most appropriate command and control
structure in order to deal effectively with task-related uncertainty. The
structure must take all sources of uncertainty into account in order to
establish effective information processing.
There are four primary sources of task-related uncertainty with
which the task force must deal: task characteristics, task environment,
inter-unit task interdependence, and technology [Ref. 25:p. 615].
1. Task Characteristics
The characteristics of a task often determine the amount of
uncertainty associated with the task during its execution. Task complex-
ity and task interdependence are characteristics of task-related
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uncertainty. Each characteristic affects the information-processing
requirements of the task. [Ref. 25:p. 615]
a. Task Complexity
Task complexity varies on a continuous scale between rou-
tine and complex. Routine tasks are those that the task force can pre-
plan or address through standard operating procedures (SOPs). Because
the uncertainty associated with a routine task is small, the information-
processing requirements are minimal. Complex tasks are those which are
not well understood or are too complicated to address in an SOP. Com-
plex tasks require substantial information-processing requirements to
deal with the increased amount of task-related uncertainty. [Ref.
25:p. 615]
b. Task Interdependence
Task interdependence is a function of the number of corre-
sponding subtasks required to accomplish one task. As the number of
subtasks required to accomplish a task increases, so does uncertainty
and its associated information-processing requirements. Singular tasks,
or those that consist of only a few subtasks, require minimal
information-processing requirements. [Ref. 25:p. 615]
2. Task Environment
The task environment is a source of uncertainty because it con-
sists of those areas or events that can affect the task force. The task force
must establish a structure that can effectively learn about and interpret
factors that are not directly under the control of the task force comman-
der and are therefore potentially unstable [Ref. 26:p. 566]. The task
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environment can be stable or dynamic, depending on how much or how
fast it changes from one existing state to another. Additionally, a hostile
enemy can affect the task environment and create uncertainty that the
commander and staff must consider.
a. Stable Environment
A stable environment enables the task force to adequately
plan or develop SOPs in order to deal with the task-related environment.
A stable, unchanging environment creates less incentive to gather infor-
mation because uncertainty is low. [Ref. 26:p. 566]
b. Dynamic Environment
An environment that is rapidly changing requires the task
force to gather more information about the environment. In a changing
environment, the task force SOPs are not able to effectively deal with the
amount of environmental uncertainty. The task force must gather and
process increased amounts of information to deal with the associated
uncertainty. [Ref. 25:p. 616]
c. Hostility
A hostile environment is one that actively deters the task
force from accomplishing its mission. The degree of hostility varies on a
continuing scale from passive to very active. A hostile environment man-
dates significantly more time and assets to conduct reconnaissance. An
active enemy creates hostility, and thus uncertainty, in the environment
by attempting to disrupt task force operations. Disruptions can be in the
form of changes to the shape of the environment through obstacle or
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barrier emplacement, or enemy elements specifically tasked to defeat
task force reconnaissance or counterreconnaissance efforts.
3. Inter-Unit Task Interdependence
A third source of task-related uncertainty is inter-unit task
interdependence. Inter-unit task interdependence is the extent to which
elements of the task force depend upon each other to accomplish their
tasks [Ref. 26:p. 564]. This interdependence creates a source of task
uncertainty that has even broader implications on information-
processing structure than task characteristics or task environment.
Elements that operate autonomously have fewer requirements
to coordinate their activities with other elements. Consequently, they rely
very little on inter-unit task interdependence to accomplish their mis-
sion, and therefore experience less task-related uncertainty. When inter-
unit task interdependence is high, the need for frequent adjustments and
coordination among all elements involved increases the amount of task-
related uncertainty.
High inter-unit task interdependence requires the task force to
provide structural links for mutual adjustment among elements. Mutual
adjustment is typically the method of coordinating a system in which
"two or more decision makers without hierarchical authority with respect
to one another (but are at the same level) mutually solve problems and
implement solutions." [Ref. 28: p. 3] Standardization is the creation of
routines that are always applied to solving problems and producing prod-
ucts in accomplishing a mission. Standardization is the best means of
coordination in the task force structure for those tasks that require low
52
inter-unit task interdependence. Direct supervision is also a method of
providing structural coordination within the task force. To the military,
direct supervision is essentially the giving of orders. Direct supervision
"creates coordination and control by internalizing the set of tasks to be
coordinated in one person." [Ref. 28:p. 2]
4. Technology
Task-related uncertainty is but one factor in the process to
achieve the most suitable organizational structure to accomplish a mis-
sion. Technology is another factor that affects structural design. Technol-
ogy is the "tools, techniques, and actions used to transform organiza-
tional inputs into outputs." [Ref. 28:p. 13] Organizational inputs at the
task force level include, but are not limited to, orders or intent from a
superior commander, intelligence information from sources outside the
task force, rules of engagement, standard operating procedures, and
mission goals. The output that the task force commander desires is the
ability to effectively bring combat power to bear against the enemy in
conjunction with the received inputs. Technology serves as the means by
which task inputs are synthesized in order to achieve an output. The
effect of technology on the input-output relationship significantly affects
organizational structure and the information processing required to
accomplish a task.
There are two underlying characteristics of technology which




Task variety is the "frequency of unexpected or novel events
that occur in the input-output process, in the technological process."
[Ref. 28:p. 14] High task variety means that the commander and his staff
cannot adequately predict problems or activities in advance. Low variety
equates to few problems in the process of converting organizational
inputs to outputs.
Tasks that contain a high degree of variety are also high in
uncertainty due to the number of problems that arise during the techno-
logical process. High variety requires a great deal of mutual adjustment
among various decision makers and staff sections. This is necessary to
deal with the frequency of changes that occur during the technological
process. Direct supervision and standardization are more appropriate to
tasks that contain low variety due to infrequent changes to routine pro-
cedures during the technological process.
b. Task Analyzability
Task analyzability is the "ability to reduce the tasks to
mechanical steps that participants can follow in a computational way to
solve problems." [Ref. 28:p. 14] A task that is analyzable lends itself to
objective, computational problem solving. A task that is not analyzable
creates problems for the commander and staff in developing exact proce-
dures that sufficiently accomplish the task. In this instance, the com-
mander relies more on judgment and experience to accomplish the task
[Ref. 26:p. 564]. The corresponding information-processing structure
must provide for coordination and control through direct supervision.
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Tasks that are analyzable can be addressed through SOPs and training.
Standardization is a sufficient means of coordination and control for
these types of tasks.
Figure 5 illustrates the four sources of task-related uncer-
tainty which combine to influence the degree of information processing
that an organization must possess [Ref. 25:p. 617]. As a task becomes
more complex or interdependent, as the task environment becomes more
dynamic or hostile, and as the inter-unit task interdependence becomes
more complex, the task force must structure and function accordingly in
order to contend with increased amounts of task-related uncertainty.
Technology, or the process of converting organizational
inputs to output(s), is critical to effective information processing. Task
variety and analyzability have significant effects on the task force com-
mand and control structure necessary to accomplish a task. Under-
standing the nature of technology helps in determining the structural
characteristics of the armor and mechanized task force when given
reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance missions.
D. SUMMARY
An armor or mechanized infantry task force command and control
structure is essentially an information processing system. The system
gathers raw data, refines it, and provides information to the commander
so he can effectively direct the combat power of the task force against the
enemy. The command and control structure must provide the means for
coordinating information sharing and division of labor among the ele-








The commander and staff must be cognizant of the sources of task
related uncertainty with respect to task force missions. Reducing uncer-
tainty in information processing should be the goal of the commander
and staff when structuring the task force command and control system.
The commander must also consider technology and its impact on
information processing. Task variety and task analyzability both affect
the command and control structure of the task force by introducing
uncertainty into the task. Each requires some sort of coordinating mech-
anism to overcome the uncertainty that technology introduces into infor-
mation processing.
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IV. STRUCTURING FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL:
COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE FOR RECONNAISSANCE
A. INTRODUCTION
The command and control structure of the task force is essentially
the organizational arrangement of personnel, equipment, and procedures
that facilitates information gathering and processing and enables the
commander to invoke the combat power of the task force against the
enemy. The command and control structure of the armor and mecha-
nized infantry task force exists to support the commander's decision-
making process. The commander and staff analyze accumulated
information in order to dissect various courses of action. Ultimately, the
commander arrives at a decision that enables him to bring adequate
combat power to bear at critical points on the battlefield. In order to syn-
chronize and coordinate combat power on the battlefield, the task force
must have a structure that provides the framework through which the
commander communicates his intent to subordinates and supervises
execution.
The structure of the armor and mechanized infantry task force has
significant impact on its ability to process information and deal with
uncertainty. For the reconnaissance mission, the task force organization
must gather, synthesize, and disseminate information so that the com-
mander can best direct the energy of the task force against the enemy.
Counterreconnaissance in the task force area of operations must deny
the enemy commander the ability to collect and process information
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about task force defensive preparations. Like reconnaissance, counterre-
connaissance requires a structure that effectively processes information.
The two missions differ in degree of task related uncertainty and
technology.
B. COORDINATING AND CONTROLLING MECHANISMS
As tasks, reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance require effec-
tive coordinating and controlling mechanisms between elements within
the task force. Direct supervision, standardization, and mutual adjust-
ment provide such mechanisms for information processing. Figure 6
illustrates a continuum of the three mechanisms based on cost, complex-
ity, and the capacity to process information [Ref. 25:p. 618]. In general,
the more complex and comprehensive the mechanisms are, the greater
their capacity to process information and reduce uncertainty. Increased
complexity and processing capacity create a structure that is more costly
in terms of time, energy, resources, and supervisory control [Ref. 25:p.
618]. Too much information-processing capacity for a particular mission
leads to high costs and redundancy, while too little capacity does not
adequately reduce uncertainty. It is up to the task force commander and
staff to determine the correct balance of complexity, cost, and capacity
when structuring the task force coordinating mechanisms for reconnais-
sance and counterreconnaissance missions. The commander's ultimate
goal is to match information processing requirements with the informa-
















Figure 6. Mechanisms for Coordination and Control
C. ELEMENTS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL DESIGN WITHIN THE
TASK FORCE
Resource limitations exist in the armor and mechanized infantry
task force during the execution of either reconnaissance or counter-
reconnaissance. The primary resources in the task force consist of
human decision makers, human information processors, and equipment.
These resources occupy functional positions within the task force
structure known as "organizational positions." Organizational positions
within the task force are responsible for executing a function or task. The
following organizational positions are representative of the resources




Decision makers exist throughout the task force by virtue of
their hierarchical position and responsibility. Decision makers are those
individuals who possess the technical skills and knowledge to analyze
information and direct that a certain subsequent action be taken. In the
task force, the task force commander is the primary decision maker.
Company/team commanders, primary staff officers, and specialty pla-
toon leaders (scout, mortar, support, medical platoons) are secondary
decision makers who act within the guidelines of the commander's intent
and established rules of engagement.
2. Information Processors
Human information processors are organizational positions that
convert data inputs into information outputs. Information processors
take raw data, often from many sources, and synthesize it into meaning-
ful information for a decision maker. Information processors within the
task force consist of staff sections or leaders (decision makers) that have
the requisite skill and training to perform this function.
3. Individual Positions
Individual positions execute some function in support of the
task force as a whole. Individual positions in the task force consist pri-
marily of weapon systems (tanks and Infantry Fighting Vehicles) and
information-gathering systems or sensors (e.g., scout squads, GSRs,
individual soldiers, fighting vehicles). Weapon systems typically execute
the commander's concept of directing energy against the enemy.
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Information-gathering systems gather raw data and provide it to informa-
tion processors within the task force.
D. RECONNAISSANCE TASK ANALYSIS
Having a firm understanding of the task or mission at hand is
essential when designing a respective command and control architecture.
Task analysis enables the commander and staff to determine the amount
of uncertainty inherent in reconnaissance. In order to establish the
degree of uncertainty in reconnaissance, the commander and staff must
evaluate the task in terms of four variables: task characteristics, task
environment, inter-unit task interdependence, and technology. Once
accomplished, the commander can establish the coordinating mecha-
nisms and command and control elements necessary to accomplish the
task.
1. Reconnaissance Task Characteristics
Reconnaissance is typically a complex task. The command and
control structure to conduct and coordinate reconnaissance is a conse-
quence of the following variables:
• The task force mission (which determines the number of reconnais-
sance subtasks that the task force must accomplish);
• The environment, which consists of:
The enemy situation;
The amount of terrain that the task force must reconnoiter;
• The amount of time available to accomplish the reconnaissance; and
• The number of elements that the task force commander assigns to
conduct the reconnaissance.
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Each variable complicates the process by which the task force
commander and staff plan and ensure accomplishment of the reconnais-
sance mission. When combined, these variables create a task that is
complex and high in relative uncertainty.
The reciprocal task interdependence of the reconnaissance
mission also creates a high degree of uncertainty. Reconnaissance is
made up of multiple subtasks that the unit must typically accomplish in
a short period of time. In a 1987 RAND study on reconnaissance at the
National Training Center, the author lists several primary subtasks that
a task force should accomplish when conducting reconnaissance:
• Locate enemy positions and the enemy reconnaissance screen;
• Establish OPs overlooking the task force objective;
• Direct artillery fire against the enemy;
• Locate obstacles;
• Breach and mark obstacles;
• Conduct route trafficability assessment and terrain reconnaissance;
• Assist in command and control during the attack; and
• Maintain timely communications (reporting). [Ref. 4:pp. 22-23]
Each primary subtask is subsequently made up of many other
secondary subtasks. The multi-layer task relationship and high degree of
task interdependence create considerable uncertainty in the reconnais-
sance mission.
2. Reconnaissance Task Environment
Terrain and degree of hostility are the primary variables that
establish an inherently dynamic reconnaissance task environment. The
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terrain on which reconnaissance forces must operate is generally well
forward of the task force. As a result, reconnaissance forces often see the
terrain for the first time as they execute their mission. Changes in the
terrain encountered by reconnaissance forces are functions of the recon-
naissance force location and variable weather conditions. Vehicle traffica-
bility can change drastically as weather conditions vary. Unfamiliar
terrain and adverse weather contribute significantly to the uncertainty in
the reconnaissance environment.
Unknown enemy strength and location also create uncertainty
in reconnaissance. Enemy measures to combat the reconnaissance effort
complicate the reconnaissance task. Enemy efforts to manipulate the ter-
rain to their advantage through use of obstacles and hidden vehicle
fighting positions create additional uncertainty with which the reconnais-
sance force must deal.
3. Inter-Unit Task Interdependence
Inter-unit task interdependence between reconnaissance ele-
ments increases as the number of interdependent reconnaissance sub-
tasks becomes greater. Consequently, the commander must consider
augmenting the scout platoon as the number of required subtasks
increase. Some elements that the task force commander may augment
the scouts with include:
• Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR). The GSR assists scouts in locat-
ing enemy counterreconnaissance forces. GSR can assist scouts as
they navigate under conditions of limited visibility. GSR can also
provide a relay or retransmission station for communications
between the reconnaissance elements and the task force
headquarters.
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• Engineers. Task force engineers can assist scouts in obstacle
breaching, route classification, and terrain analysis.
• Infantry. Infantry can help scouts in locating and marking infiltra-
tion routes for dismounted attacks. Infantry can conduct route
reconnaissance along the intended task force axis of advance. [Ref.
4:pp. 23-24]
Devoting more elements to perform reconnaissance subtasks
causes an increase in inter-unit task interdependence and thus uncer-
tainty. As size of the the reconnaissance force increases and becomes
more diverse, the commander and staff must establish coordinating
mechanisms that facilitate information sharing and mutual problem solv-
ing. These mechanisms are necessary to assuage the increase in task-
related uncertainty.
4. Technology
Task variety in reconnaissance is high because the commander
and staff cannot adequately predict task-related problems that may
occur. High task variety is attributable to reconnaissance assets that
break down, become lost, or are engaged by the enemy. Losing communi-
cations with reconnaissance elements due to distance or terrain is a
common occurrence during reconnaissance missions [Ref. 6:p. 7], The
extended distances associated with reconnaissance missions makes it
difficult to adjust to unforeseen problems.
At first glance, it seems that the technology associated with
reconnaissance is analyzable. Field Manual 17-98 [Scout Platoon) and
Mission Training Plan 17-57-10 provide excellent sources of doctrinal
guidance for the execution of reconnaissance missions [Ref. 29:p. 4]. In a
stable environment, doctrine provides the technology to effectively
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conduct reconnaissance. The high uncertainty in the reconnaissance
environment, however, does not lend itself to objective, computational
problem solving. The dynamic nature of reconnaissance requires decision
makers to rely on judgment and experience in order to resolve the prob-
lems associated with planning and executing the task. Leader training
provides the experience necessary to conduct effective reconnaissance
operations.
The task characteristics, task environment, inter-unit task
interdependence, and technology of reconnaissance combine to make it a
complex and dynamic task of high uncertainty. The inability to predict
the problems associated with conducting reconnaissance requires deci-
sion makers in the command and control structure to use judgment and
experience rather than standardized routines to respond to problems. By
analyzing the reconnaissance task, the commander and his staff are able
to structure the task force to effectively deal with the uncertainty of the
task itself.
E. RECONNAISSANCE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
The armor and mechanized infantry task force requires a command
and control structure that can gather and process a large amount of
information in order to reduce the high uncertainty associated with
reconnaissance. When designing the correct structure, it is essential that
the commander and staff first identify the assets and coordinating mech-
anisms that are essential to the reconnaissance task. The commander
and staff should conduct a systematic task analysis of the reconnais-
sance task based on the present and possibly future state of the task
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variables in order to determine the necessary assets and coordinating
mechanisms.
Upon completion of the task analysis, the commander and staff
must then identify and prioritize reconnaissance subtasks (from para-
graph D.l.) which are fundamental to the success of the task force mis-
sion. The priority given to each subtask may vary in accordance with how
much information is known about the enemy and the environment.
The commander and staff must then define specific collection sub-
tasks for the scout platoon. Since most effective scout platoons obtain
detailed combat information through stealthy dismounted patrolling and
stationary observation, it is essential that the scouts be given sufficient
time to accomplish their subtasks [Ref. 6:p. 8]. Should the time required
to accomplish the subtasks exceed the time available, the commander
must then look beyond the scout platoon for reconnaissance assets.
Assets that augment the scout platoon should be given only those sub-
tasks that they can be reasonably expected to accomplish.
As the reconnaissance force takes shape, the commander and staff
must determine the coordinating mechanisms essential to processing
information and reducing uncertainty. Analysis of inter-unit task rela-
tionships and technology within the force assists in determining the
appropriate coordinating mechanisms.
The task force headquarters organization design is essential to the
success of the reconnaissance effort as well. In doctrine and practice, the
individual positions in the headquarters organization are stable [Ref.
30:p. 131]. The coordinating mechanisms that the headquarters
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organization establishes, however, are not fixed. Coordinating mecha-
nisms between elements in the headquarters organization assist the
reconnaissance force by synchronizing task force support assets. Deci-
sion makers within the organization provide direction to the reconnais-
sance force [Ref. 6:p. 7]. The locations of both are subject to change
depending on the uncertainty of and required technology for the task at
hand.
The following command and control structure for reconnaissance
utilizes only those assets that are organic or traditionally attached to a
typical armor and mechanized infantry task force. The allocation of task
force assets to each subtask is an example of what a commander might
appropriate to each, but this is by no means the only possible combina-
tion. The intent is to present a structure that effectively reduces the
uncertainty of the reconnaissance mission and lends itself to efficient
information processing.
1. Reconnaissance Organization
The typical reconnaissance organization consists of those assets
that gather, process, and communicate information to secondary deci-
sion makers. The commander and staff array the assets in accordance
with the subtasks that each must execute. Because of the complex
nature of reconnaissance, it is best to divide the task into horizontally
specialized subtasks that are "narrow" in scope. As a result, the most
appropriate organization for reconnaissance is one that "groups" assets
in accordance with the subtask(s) that they must accomplish. The
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demands of each subtask may require the commander to combine vari-
ous task force assets.
Dividing the reconnaissance organization (Figure 7) into three
teams (A, B, and C) enables the commander to adequately address the
subtasks that are typical of the reconnaissance task. Each team is
responsible for conducting specific reconnaissance subtasks. All three
teams are under the direction of a decision maker who is responsible for
the execution of various subtasks.
Figure 8 depicts the communications network of the task force
headquarters and reconnaissance organizations. The scout platoon
leader and platoon sergeant receive direction from the task force head-
quarters, usually the task force S-2 and S-3, on the task force command
frequency. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant send processed
information to the headquarters on the task force command frequency.
The elements of the reconnaissance force communicate with one another
by radio on the scout platoon frequency. The GSR section communicates
using its own frequency, with only the section leader responsible for
maintaining communication with the scout platoon leader on the scout
platoon frequency. [Ref. 6:pp. 6, 8]
The platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and GSR section leader
are responsible for directing the effort of their respective teams while
retaining the capability, through mutual adjustment, to react quickly to
variety and environmental uncertainty. By dividing the reconnaissance



























































complexity and better manage inter-unit task interdependence. The end
result is reduced uncertainty and increased information-processing
capacity.
a. Team A
Team A (Figure 9) is under the direction of the scout pla-
toon leader. The team is responsible for conducting reconnaissance of the
task force objective as well as locating enemy defensive positions and the
enemy counterreconnaissance screen. The team must establish observa-
tion posts that are capable of keeping all three under constant
surveillance.
(1) Individual Positions. The individual positions in Team
A are the scout platoon leader and three scout sections. Each scout sec-
tion (two HMMWVs, one motorcycle, and six scouts) consists of two scout
squads (see Figure 4 in Chapter II). The scout section primarily gathers
raw data about the objective and the enemy. The limited number of team
subtasks provide the sections the time they require to utilize deliberate
movement techniques and dismount when necessary. Platoon and indi-
vidual training adequately prepares each section leader to direct artillery
fire against the enemy, one of the reconnaissance subtasks, as well.
The scout platoon leader provides command and con-
trol for Team A. His squad conducts supplementary observation of the
task force route of attack while assisting in the movement of the task





(2) Information Processing. Information processors syn-
thesize the raw data collected by the scouts into meaningful information
for a decision maker. Information processors in Team A are the scout
section leaders and the scout platoon leader. As the scout squads locate
and observe both the objective and the enemy (raw data), the section
leaders convert the observations into reports. The reports are then sent
to the scout platoon leader on the scout platoon frequency.
The scout platoon leader refines the information given
to him by the section leaders and sends it to the task force headquarters
on the task force command frequency. Transmitting on the command
frequency helps to reduce uncertainty by "providing most of the task
force with an appreciation of the situation ahead." [Ref. 6:p. 8]
(3) Decision Makers. The primary decision maker for
Team A is the scout platoon leader. The scout platoon leader directs the
reconnaissance effort of Team A, ensuring that the scout sections act
within the task force commander's intent and established rules of
engagement. The scout section leaders act as secondary decision makers.
The section leaders can make decisions that require immediate action
but are otherwise limited in authority and rely on the task force com-
mander's intent and scout platoon leader's guidance for direction.
(4) Coordinating Mechanisms. By virtue of unknown ter-
rain and enemy locations, the team must operate in an environment of
high uncertainty. High task uncertainty is also a result of the complex
nature of the reconnaissance task and the commander's need for consid-
erable information. Mutual adjustment (see Figure 6) facilitates
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information sharing and mutual problem solving between the scout
sections. Operating on the same radio frequency allows the section
leaders to coordinate through mutual adjustment and thereby reduce
uncertainty. Should the reconnaissance effort become disrupted through
enemy contact, the scout platoon leader can make immediate adjust-
ments of which all sections will be aware.
Inasmuch as the technology needed to conduct the
reconnaissance task is not analyzable, the scout platoon leader provides
direct supervision to the section leaders. By virtue of his training and
experience, the platoon leader is able to determine the proper techniques
and methods that will guide the effort of the team toward successful
completion of all reconnaissance subtasks.
b. Team B
Team B (Figure 10) is under the control of the scout pla-
toon sergeant. The team is responsible for conducting the following
reconnaissance subtasks: locate and breach enemy obstacles, conduct
route trafficabiliry and terrain assessment, and conduct route reconnais-
sance. The team supports the task force movement along the axis of
advance and through any breach sites.
(1) Individual Positions. The individual positions in
Team B are the scout platoon sergeant, one scout section, two engineer
squads, and one infantry squad. The scout section consists of two
HMMWVs, one motorcycle, and six scouts. Each engineer squad is com-




engineers. The infantry squad consists of one M2 Infantry Fighting Vehi-
cle (IFV) and nine squad members.
The scout section and the engineer squads are
responsible for gathering raw data about enemy obstacle locations and
determining possible breach sites. As they maneuver along the task force
axis of advance, the scouts and engineers conduct a terrain assessment
to determine trafficability. The infantry squad is responsible for recon-
naissance of the task force axis of advance to ensure that it is clear of
obstacles and enemy forces. Limiting the number of subtasks that each
team element is to perform assists in further simplifying the reconnais-
sance task and reducing task uncertainty.
The scout platoon sergeant provides command and
control for Team B. Like the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant main-
tains observation of the task force axis of advance and supports the
movement of the task force. The scout platoon sergeant, scout section
leader, engineer squad leaders, and infantry squad leader are capable of
directing artillery fires against the enemy as well.
(2) Information Processing. The engineer squad leaders,
scout section leaders, and the scout platoon sergeant are capable of pro-
cessing raw data into information. As the engineer squads and the scout
section locate obstacles (raw data), they must determine each obstacle's
composition, length, and width; the existence of enemy coverage; and
breaching requirements (information processing). The engineer squad or
scout section leaders transmit the information to the scout platoon ser-
geant on the scout platoon frequency. The infantry squad must send its
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data to the scout platoon sergeant for processing. The platoon sergeant
refines the information and reports it to the task force headquarters on
the task force command frequency.
(3) Decision Makers. The primary decision maker for
Team B is the scout platoon sergeant. The scout section leader, engineer
squad leaders, and infantry squad leader are secondary decision makers.
As the primary decision maker, the platoon sergeant directs the recon-
naissance effort of the team by providing direction to the scout section
leader, the engineer squad leaders, and the infantry squad leader. Like
the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant guides the team within the scope
of the commander's intent and the task force rules of engagement. The
secondary decision makers can make decisions that directly affect their
section or squads in situations that demand immediate action.
(4) Coordinating Mechanisms. Team B relies on mutual
adjustment between the scouts and engineers to reduce uncertainty
caused by inter-unit task interdependence and the task force comman-
der's increased need of information (see Figure 6). Operating on a com-
mon radio frequency (scout platoon frequency) allows the scouts and
engineers to remain aware of what each is doing at any specific point
during the reconnaissance. Providing this capability enhances coordina-
tion and subtask execution. The platoon sergeant provides direct super-
vision to the infantry squad in order to coordinate its activities with
respect to team subtask responsibilities. The squad does not require
mutual adjustment with the rest of the team due to the distinct nature of
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its subtask. The platoon sergeant provides assistance to the infantry
squad as needed.
c. Team C
Team C (Figure 1 1) consists of a GSR section of two teams.
Each team has three soldiers, one AN/PPS-5 radar, and an Ml 13 APC.
The GSR section maneuvers to the rear or flanks of the forwardmost
reconnaissance elements. The section is responsible for conducting radar
surveillance ahead of the scout platoon as the platoon moves toward the
task force objective. The GSRs attempt to locate the enemy counterrecon-
naissance force as well as vehicle concentrations that are indicative of
enemy defensive positions.
(1) Individual Positions. The individual positions in
Team C are the two GSR teams, one of which is led by the section leader.
The section gathers raw data through continuous all-weather battlefield
surveillance. The GSR section has a supplementary mission to provide
communications relay or retransmission from Teams A and B to the
headquarters organization.
(2) Information Processing. The GSR teams act as their
own processors of raw data. Well-trained teams are capable of detecting
targets by type and providing accurate range and azimuth readings to
each. The section leader reports the processed data to both the scout pla-
toon leader and platoon sergeant on the platoon frequency.
(3) Decision Makers. The primary decision maker for

























































the scout platoon for the reconnaissance task, the platoon leader is
responsible for its employment [Ref. 15:p. 6-41]. The GSR section leader
is the secondary decision maker for the section. The section leader makes
decisions regarding alternate positions for the GSR teams, displacement
criteria, and technique of radar coverage due to enemy direction-finding
and jamming.
(4) Coordinating Mechanisms. Operating on the same
radio frequency provides the section with common information and the
ability to conduct the mutual adjustment essential to coordinating the
radar surveillance effort. The section leader receives direction from the
scout platoon leader in order to coordinate GSR capabilities with the
efforts of Teams A and B. Mutual adjustment between the GSR section
leader and both the scout platoon leader and the platoon sergeant
reduces inter-unit task interdependence uncertainty. Transmitting GSR
detections on the scout platoon frequency alerts Teams A and B to possi-
ble enemy locations and reduces the possibility of their blundering into
the enemy counterreconnaissance element.
2. Headquarters Organization
The task force headquarters organization (Figure 12) consists of
the elements in the task force headquarters that receive reports from the
reconnaissance force, refine the information, and disseminate it to the
commander, higher headquarters, and the remainder of the task force.
Information is used by the commander to make decisions that will "pull"














The S-2 and S-3 staff elements and the task force executive
officer (XO) are the principal individual positions within the task force
headquarters organization. All three ensure that the commander's recon-
naissance goals are met by the reconnaissance force. The XO is the task
force second in command (2IC). The XO is responsible for synchronizing
the actions of the task force staff elements.
The S-2 and S-3 staffs ensure that the reconnaissance
force operates in accordance with the commander's intent and estab-
lished rules of engagement. The task force S-2 is responsible for planning
and coordinating the reconnaissance and surveillance plan within the
scope of the commander's guidance. The task force S-3 tasks the plan to
subordinates and monitors the execution of the reconnaissance task.
Both the S-2 and S-3 generate requests for information in order to con-
firm or deny the S-2's Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The
S-3 refines the task force operations plan based on the accuracy of the
S-2's intelligence estimate [Ref. 31:p. 16]. The task force Fire Support
Element (FSE) monitors the reconnaissance effort in order to confirm the
task force fire support plan. The Fire Support Officer (FSO) plans and
executes the reconnaissance force's indirect fire (direct support artillery
and organic task force mortars) support plan.
b. Information Processing
The S-2 and S-3 work collectively to refine the S-2's IPB
based on the information and reports sent by the reconnaissance force.
The S-2 uses information from the reconnaissance force to confirm his
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terrain analysis and estimate of the enemy situation. The S-3 uses the
information to plan various courses of action for the task force mission.
Once the commander decides on a course of action, the S-3 uses infor-
mation from the reconnaissance to refine the task force scheme of
maneuver. Both the S-2 and S-3 are responsible for processing the
reports from the reconnaissance force into reports for higher
headquarters.
The FSE uses information from the reconnaissance to
devise a fire support plan for the task force mission. The FSE responds to
reports of enemy locations by requesting indirect fires from the task force
mortar platoon or the direct support artillery unit.
c. Decision Makers
The task force commander is the primary decision maker
within the task force. The commander makes decisions concerning the
task force concept of operation based on information collected from the
reconnaissance force. The task force S-2, S-3, and FSO are secondary
decision makers. As the primary staff officer for each staff element, all
three are responsible for making decisions that are within their area of
responsibility and the commander's guidance. The importance of infor-
mation to each staff element requires their active participation in the
reconnaissance operation. [Ref. 6:p. 7]
The task force executive officer (XO), by virtue of his posi-
tion in the headquarters organization, is also a secondary decision
maker. The XO typically makes decisions that coordinate the actions of
the entire task force staff. However, as second in command of the task
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force, he can exercise decision-making authority over a single staff ele-
ment as well.
d. Coordinating Mechanisms
Mutual adjustment exists among the staff sections to
ensure that the intelligence and maneuver aspects of the task force mis-
sion are coordinated. The mutual adjustment is essential to minimize the
uncertainty of inter-unit task interdependence that exists between the
staff elements.
The FSE and the S-2 coordinate through mutual adjust-
ment to minimize task complexity and inter-unit task interdependence.
The intelligence information gathered and reported to the S-2 provides
the FSE with fresh target information. The FSE must consider the loca-
tions of the reconnaissance force while planning for the displacement of
indirect fire support units so that they can range forward of the recon-
naissance force [Ref. 6:p. 8]. Restricted Fire Areas (RFA) are planned by
the FSE and coordinated with the S-2 to prevent the reconnaissance
force from being killed by preplanned artillery and mortar fires.
The task force commander and XO provide direct supervi-
sion to the staff elements in the headquarters organization. The XO
supervises the efforts of the staff to ensure that they adequately support
the reconnaissance force. The XO helps to reduce task variety by coordi-
nating the forward positioning of service support assets capable of
responding to unforeseen events and the needs of the reconnaissance
force. The commander provides direction to the staff based upon his
guidance from the task force's parent headquarters. The task force
85
commander's initial planning guidance allows the staff to perform their
estimates and determine what information they will need to confirm or
refute the assessments.
Figure 13 depicts the task force as it is organized to con-
duct the reconnaissance mission. The headquarters organization deter-
mines the subtasks that the reconnaissance organization must execute
and communicates them to the scout platoon leader in the form of mis-
sion statements, commander's intent, and rules of engagement. The
reconnaissance organization gathers and processes information about
the enemy and the task force area of operations in accordance with the
direction provided by the headquarters organization. The scout platoon
leader and platoon sergeant communicate this information to the head-
quarters organization using the task force command frequency. The GSR
section leader provides communications retransmission when needed.
The staff uses the information from the reconnaissance
organization to confirm their estimates of the situation and reduce the
uncertainty of the task force mission. Coordination through mutual
adjustment and direct supervision ensures that task uncertainty and
variety are kept to a minimum within the task force headquarters organi-
zation. The elements of the staff at the task force headquarters organiza-
tion analyze and refine (processing) this information in order to support
each of their internal needs. The task force staff also sends the informa-









Figure 13. Top-Level Organization for Reconnaissance
F. SUMMARY
The task force command and control structure supports the com-
mander in the decision-making process. The structure serves as an
information-processing system that enables the commander to effectively
direct the combat power of the task force against an enemy.
Direct supervision, mutual adjustment, and standardization provide
coordinating and controlling mechanisms in the task force to facilitate
information processing. The commander must determine the correct mix
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of these mechanisms based on their cost, complexity, and information-
processing capacity. The commander must balance the information-pro-
cessing requirements of the task force with the information-processing
capacity within the task force structure.
The high degree of task uncertainty and variety associated with the
reconnaissance task requires a structure that can reduce the interdepen-
dence and complexity of the task. The commander can reduce the com-
plexity of the collection effort by dividing reconnaissance into subtasks.
The task force S-3 can then assign the appropriate assets to each sub-
task. After building the reconnaissance force around the subtasks, the
commander and staff must ensure that the necessary coordinating
mechanisms are in place. Mutual adjustment and direct supervision
within the structure provide the mechanisms to deal with the unanalyz-
able technology and high inter-unit task interdependence uncertainty.
The structure of the task force headquarters must take the same task
variables into account. While individual positions within the headquar-
ters do not deviate from established doctrine, the structure must contain
the coordinating mechanisms necessary to reduce uncertainty.
The fact that the task force faces different conditions over time
requires that the structure of the task force be modified to meet the
changed information-processing requirements. Structuring the task force
to accomplish different tasks is a dynamic process that is never fully
accomplished. As the information-processing requirements of a task
change, so too must the task force structure. This is especially true in
the case of reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. The inherent
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differences between the two demands a distinct structure to successfully
accomplish each mission.
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V. C2 ARCHITECTURE FOR COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
A. INTRODUCTION
Unlike reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance is not routinely a
task or mission for which a commander may structure his command and
control. Instead, it is the aggregation of all actions taken by the task
force at each echelon in order to counter enemy reconnaissance efforts.
Companies are capable of conducting counterreconnaissance by virtue of
the patrols they conduct and the observation posts that they plan and
occupy. Individual soldiers conduct counterreconnaissance by vigilantly
watching over their assigned area of observation. Therefore, counterre-
connaissance is the requirement of every soldier, vehicle crew, and unit
in the task force throughout the depth of the area of operations.
Perhaps the most important aspect of counterreconnaissance is the
"screen," a task for which the commander can structure his forces and
coordinating mechanisms. The task force screen is typically a force that
"provides early warning of enemy approach" as well as "real time infor-
mation, reaction time, and maneuver space for the main body" of the
task force [Ref. 15:p. 4-17]. According to Field Manual 101-5-1 {Opera-
tional Terms and Graphics), a screening force "maintains surveillance,
provides early warning to the main body, impedes and harasses the
enemy with supporting indirect fires, and destroys enemy reconnaissance
elements within its capability." [Ref. 17:p. 1-64] The task force scout
platoon is capable of conducting a screen that provides early warning to
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the task force and uses indirect fire to hinder the maneuver of enemy
reconnaissance assets. The limited direct-fire capability of the scout
platoon, combined with the commander's desire to preserve his "eyes and
ears," restricts the platoon from engaging in direct combat with enemy
reconnaissance patrols.
The limitations of the scout platoon in conducting an effective screen
against a sizeable and potent enemy reconnaissance force require the
commander to augment the scouts with a force that is capable of killing
enemy reconnaissance assets [Ref. 32:p. 6]. A reaction force is necessary
in order to destroy enemy reconnaissance as it is observed and reported
by the scout platoon [Ref. 6:p. 10]. The reaction force can take on many
shapes and sizes, but it must be capable of dealing with the assets that
the enemy commander devotes to reconnaissance.
The commander must determine the appropriate mix of task force
assets that can gather raw data about the enemy reconnaissance effort,
process the data into useable information, and subsequently defeat the
enemy reconnaissance force forward of the task force battle position. The
commander must identify the mechanisms that enable the screening
force to coordinate its effort against the enemy. To do this, the comman-
der must conduct a task analysis of the screen mission in order to iden-
tify the size of the force and the coordinating mechanisms required to
execute the task.
B. SCREEN TASK ANALYSIS
The commander and his staff conduct a task analysis of the screen
mission in order to determine its associated degree of uncertainty. The
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commander and staff analyze the task in terms of its characteristics,
environment, inter-unit task interdependence, and technology so that
they may determine where and to what extent task uncertainty exists.
1. Screen Task Characteristics
The screen task is a relatively routine task in terms of task-
related uncertainty. The flexibility associated with the screen allows the
commander to quickly emplace the screen force [Ref. 6: p. 13]. Quick
positioning provides the force time to conduct an extensive terrain anal-
ysis of an area that is typically small in terms of width and depth. Given
more time to cover less space, the commander and staff can easily
improve the composition of the screening force as the enemy situation
unfolds. The increase in time and subsequent familiarity with the envi-
ronment, combined with the flexibility that the commander has in posi-
tioning assets to meet the threat, significantly diminishes the uncertainty
in the task.
The low degree of task-related uncertainty is also a result of the
few subtasks that are associated with a screen. The three subtasks of the
screening force are:
• Gain and maintain contact with the enemy to provide early warning
to the task force main body;
• Destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance units within the capabilities
of the screening force; and
• Impede and harass enemy main force units with indirect fire. [Ref.
32:p. 4]
These subtasks remain constant for the screen task no matter
what the enemy situation, task force mission, or task environment. The
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small number of recurring subtasks establishes a minimal amount of
uncertainty that the commander and staff must consider when organiz-
ing a command and control structure for the screen mission.
2. Screen Task Environment
At first glance, it would seem that the screen task environment
is somewhat dynamic. Like the reconnaissance environment, variations
in the weather can cause drastic changes in the task environment. Poor
weather conditions can actually create an advantage for the screening
force by reducing the trafficability of enemy reconnaissance assets and
thereby limiting them to more restrictive avenues of approach. Changes
in the weather can become almost negligible to the screening force
because it can often acquire and engage enemy reconnaissance elements
from static positions. The screening force is able to reduce the environ-
mental uncertainty caused by weather effects through its ability to
reconnoiter the area of operations for the best maneuver routes. Recon-
naissance of the area allows the screening force to locate and use the
most trafficable routes and avoid those areas that are potentially hazard-
ous to maneuver.
The considerable number of assets that the commander can
expect the enemy to devote to reconnaissance creates a potentially hos-
tile environment [Ref. 32:pp. 5-6]. However, the task force commander is
capable of effectively dealing with these assets by placing surveillance
elements in well-hidden positions while supporting them with responsive
artillery fires. Additionally, establishing a reaction force of sufficient
93
strength and firepower effectively negates the combat reconnaissance
patrols of the enemy reconnaissance effort.
Thus, environmental uncertainty is minimal due to the task
force commander's ability to sufficiently cope with the changes in the
environment as well as with a hostile enemy.
3. Inter-Unit Task Interdependence
Inter-unit task interdependence within the screen task exists as
a result of the relationship between the surveillance force and the reac-
tion force. The reaction force depends on surveillance assets to provide
information as to the location, composition, and activity of enemy recon-
naissance. The surveillance force, limited in firepower and restricted by
the commander's need to preserve it for future tasks, directs the reaction
force into positions from which it is capable of killing the enemy recon-
naissance. The uncertainty that emanates from this relationship creates
a need for increased information sharing and mutual problem solving
between the two forces. The commander must establish a coordinating
mechanism that eliminates the uncertainty and provides a responsive
structure for either information sharing or mutual adjustment.
4. Technology
Screen task variety is high due to the number of unforeseen
problems that arise during task planning and execution. The static
nature of the screening force, combined with the short distance between
it and the task force support mechanisms and facilities (generally
between five and seven kilometers from the screen), reduces task uncer-
tainty to a manageable level.
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The limited number of recurring subtasks (essentially surveil-
lance and destruction of enemy reconnaissance) enable the commander
and staff to clearly define the task force procedures that are essential
when executing the screen task. The analyzability and low complexity of
the task minimizes uncertainty and allows the commander to standardize
the procedures used by the task force when planning and executing the
screen mission.
The uncertainty associated with the screen mission is low, but
some mutual adjustment is required to effectively coordinate the actions
of the surveillance elements and the reaction force. The well-defined sub-
tasks are suitable to surveillance assets and combat forces within the
task force. Matching a specific subtask to elements within the task force
that are functionally designed to accomplish the subtask (scouts to con-
duct surveillance, tanks and IFVs to destroy the enemy) reduces uncer-
tainty, minimizes information processing, and enables the commander to
predetermine, or standardize, the processes and functions required to
accomplish the screen task (see Figure 6 in Chapter IV). The structure
subsequently revolves around the functional capabilities (surveillance
and combat power) of the various elements charged with executing the
screen task.
C. COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE SCREEN COMMAND AND CON-
TROL ARCHITECTURE
The low task uncertainty and the ability of the commander to stan-
dardize work processes of the screening force favors a structure that is
organized around the functional capabilities of task force assets. To
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execute the task, the commander organizes the screening force around a
surveillance force and a reaction force. The inter-unit task interdepen-
dence between the two forces requires a coordinating mechanism that
facilitates either mutual problem solving or commonly distributed
information.
1. Screening Force Organization
The screening force (Figure 14) is responsible for acquiring and
killing enemy reconnaissance elements. The surveillance force (consisting
of the scout platoon and the GSR section) detects enemy reconnaissance
efforts by employing multiple security elements and systems throughout
the depth of the task force area of operations [Ref. 1 l:p. 3]. The reaction
force— in this case a mechanized infantry team (a company-level organi-
zation consisting of two mechanized infantry platoons and one tank pla-
toon)— uses the information provided by the surveillance force to quickly
locate and destroy the enemy reconnaissance elements [Ref. 18:p. 2].
Using an entire team (essentially one-fourth of the task force combat
power) instead of one or two platoons enables the reaction force to use its
organic headquarters and thus facilitate command and control [Ref.
32:p. 8].
The screening force receives direction from the task force com-
mander and S-3. The commander's intent and the S-3's counterrecon-
naissance plan designate specific collection tasks for the screening force.
The commander's intent and the counterreconnaissance plan supple-














Figure 14. Screening Force Organization
accomplish the screen task. The commander and the S-3 direct and
control the operation and ensure that the actions of the surveillance
force, the reaction force, and supporting artillery are synchronized [Ref.
6:p. 13].
The task force commander uses standardization and mutual
adjustment to control the efforts of the screening force. The commander
can quickly react to environmental and mission changes by standardiz-
ing the procedures that the task force uses when conducting a screen.
The commander establishes standardization within the task force by
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consistently using the same elements (e.g., the scouts and a mechanized
infantry team) to execute the few habitual subtasks of the screen. This
practice leads to familiarity among the various elements of the screening
force, not only with their respective subtask but with each other as well.
There are, however, some problems in relying totally on stan-
dardization to coordinate the efforts of the screening force. As the enemy
reconnaissance units attempt to infiltrate the task force sector, the
scouts identify them and report their location to the headquarters and
the reaction force. The scouts normally harass and impede the progress
of the enemy with artillery fire while the reaction force moves into posi-
tions from which it can engage and destroy the enemy [Ref. 6:p. 14]. This
means that the reaction force obtains information about the location and
strength of the enemy simply by monitoring the scouts' reports to the
headquarters on the task force command frequency (Figure 15). The
reaction force uses the information to locate and engage the enemy. In
this simplified case, the command and control architecture does not
require mutual adjustment to facilitate mutual problem solving among
the two elements of the screening force.
Unfortunately, several conditions exist on the battlefield that
necessitate the use of mutual adjustment between the surveillance force
and the reaction force. The need to continuously update the location of
friendly surveillance elements as a means of preventing fratricide is one
condition which would require mutual adjustment between the two
forces in the screening force. The possibility also exists that, despite the
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depth of overlapping observation by surveillance assets, contact with the
enemy reconnaissance elements could be lost. This would require the
scouts, because of their static positions, to hand over to the reaction
force the task of reestablishing contact with the enemy. Additionally,
unexpected losses or maintenance difficulties (task variety) within the
surveillance force may require the reaction force to temporarily assist in
conducting observation of the task force sector in excess of their normal
observation requirements. Mutual adjustment between the two forces
overcomes each of these unexpected events.
It might seem practical to have the screening force under the
control of a single commander [Ref. 6:p. 12]. This would seem to facilitate
command and control through direct supervision. However, the habitual
relationship that standardization provides between the surveillance force,
the reaction force, and their respective subtasks eliminates the need for a
"screening force commander.*' The addition of a single commander cre-
ates an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy between the task force com-
mander and the scout platoon leader. The additional level of command
created by this decision would require the platoon leader to communicate
on three radio frequencies at once (task force command, scout platoon,
and screening force). The task force headquarters is a suitable headquar-




The surveillance force (Figure 16) is under the direction of
the scout platoon leader. The surveillance force is responsible for estab-
lishing observation posts throughout the task force area of operations.
While the surveillance force should avoid direct-fire engagements with
the enemy, it is capable of directing artillery against both mounted and
dismounted enemy reconnaissance assets.
(1) Individual Positions. The individual positions in the
surveillance force are the scout platoon and the GSR section. The scout
platoon consists of the platoon headquarters (platoon leader and platoon
sergeant) and four scout sections (two HMMWVs, one motorcycle, and six
scouts each). The scout platoon and the GSR section conduct surveil-
lance and operate observation posts in order to gather raw data about
the enemy reconnaissance efforts. The size of the force designated to
perform this subtask provides redundancy in the surveillance effort as
well as the capability to establish overlapping fields of observation
throughout the task force area [Ref. 33:pp. 35-36].
The scout platoon leader provides command and con-
trol for the surveillance force, with the platoon sergeant assisting as nec-
essary. The GSR section leader directs the surveillance efforts of his
teams in accordance with guidance from the scout platoon leader and
that contained in the task force counterreconnaissance plan.
(2) Information Processing. The GSR and scout section
leaders use standardized reporting procedures to convert observations
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(raw data) from their team/squads into information. The section leaders
report the information to the scout platoon leader on the scout platoon
frequency. The platoon leader collects (processes) the observations of all
sections and sends the information to the task force headquarters on the
task force command frequency [Ref. 6: p. 13].
(3) Decision Makers. The primary decision maker for the
surveillance force is the scout platoon leader. The platoon leader selects
the general location of the force's observation posts so that they "have
long range observation along the high speed avenues of approach" and
provide depth throughout the sector [Ref. 15:p. 4-25]. The platoon leader
ensures that the surveillance force operates according to standardized
procedures, the commander's intent, and the task force counterrecon-
naissance plan.
The platoon sergeant and the scout section leaders act
as secondary decision makers. The scout platoon sergeant assists the
platoon leader in the command and control of the surveillance force. The
platoon sergeant and the section leaders have the authority to make
decisions as long as they abide by the commander's intent and the pla-
toon leader's guidance.
(4) Coordinating Mechanisms. The need for minimal infor-
mation processing due to the low task uncertainty of the screen task
enables the task force commander to standardize the subtask procedures
of the surveillance force (see Figure 6). By operating on the same trans-
mission frequency, the elements of the surveillance force are able to
share commonly distributed information. This information sharing gives
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each scout and GSR the location of any observed enemy reconnaissance
assets as well as the current status of surveillance force elements. The
scout platoon leader provides direct supervision to the force when enemy
actions mandate deviation from established procedures or the counterre-
connaissance plan.
b. Reaction Force
The reaction force (Figure 17), a mechanized infantry team,
is under the command and control of the team commander. The team
uses information provided by the surveillance force to locate and destroy
enemy reconnaissance assets. The team is capable of using direct and
indirect fires to engage both mounted and dismounted enemy reconnais-
sance elements. Additionally, the team uses the optical sights of its wea-
pon systems to conduct limited surveillance of the area of operations.
(1) Individual Positions. The individual positions in the
reaction force are the team commander, executive officer, first sergeant,
Fire Support Team (one Ml 13 APC), two mechanized infantry platoons
(four M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles each), and one tank platoon (four Ml
Abrams tanks). The team commander and executive officer provide com-
mand and control to the team. The first sergeant is responsible for syn-
chronizing the logistical and administrative support elements of the
team. The FIST, under the direction of the team Fire Support Officer
(FSO), communicates with the task force FSO and requests indirect fires
in support of the reaction force artillery plan and calls for fire from the
team's own forward observers (one in each platoon). The mechanized
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infantry platoons and the tank platoon conduct battle drills to engage
and destroy enemy reconnaissance assets. Each platoon has the capa-
bility to conduct day or night observation of their task force sector of
responsibility.
(2) Information Processing. The infantry and tank platoon
leaders convert any raw data gathered by their individual elements into
reports (information). The reports are sent to the team commander, who
refines the information and sends it to the task force headquarters on the
task force command frequency. The XO is capable of performing this
function at the commander's request. The FIST gathers raw data and
processes it into reports that are sent to the team commander on the
team command frequency. The team FSO also sends the information
using digital communications to the task force FSO on the fire support
frequency.
(3) Decision Makers. The primary decision maker for the
reaction force is the team commander. The team commander directs the
elements of the force against observed enemy reconnaissance elements
using established procedures (battle drills). The team commander is
responsible for ensuring that the team acts in accordance with standard-
ized procedures, the commander's intent, and the task force counterre-
connaissance plan. The team XO, as the designated second in command
(2IC), assists the commander in accordance with established procedures
and at the commander's request. The platoon leaders, the team FSO, and
the first sergeant act as secondary decision makers. The platoon leaders
direct the actions of their respective platoons in accordance with
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established procedures and the instructions of the team commander. The
FSO and first sergeant are authorized to make decisions within their
areas of responsibility that assist in the support and synchronization of
the team.
(4) Coordinating Mechanisms. The team commander pro-
vides direction to the platoon leaders, the FSO, the XO, and the first
sergeant. The commander determines which elements (either the assets
available to the FSO or those in the three platoons) are to engage the
enemy based on information provided by the surveillance force. Either
standardized procedures or direction from higher headquarters deter-
mines the type of fires, direct or indirect, that the team commander will
use against the enemy reconnaissance. Mutual adjustment exists
between the platoons in order to reduce the possibility of fratricide as
well as to coordinate the engagement of the enemy. Mutual adjustment is
especially important in situations where the team commander directs
more than one platoon to engage the enemy.
2. Headquarters Organization
The headquarters organization (Figure 18) provides the screen-
ing force with direction for the execution of the screen task. Direction to
the screening force is in the form of the commander's intent and the S-3's
counterreconnaissance plan, both of which supplement the standard
procedures that the task force uses when conducting a screen. The
screening force provides the headquarters with information that the




















Figure 18. Headquarters Organization
a. Individual Positions
The S-2 and S-3 staff elements are the principal individual
positions within the headquarters organization during the screen task.
The S-2 conducts IPB for the task force sector so that the commander
can use it while developing a tentative course of action for the upcoming
task force mission and then establish his Priority Intelligence Require-
ments and Information Requirements (PIR/IR) [Ref. 6: p. 10]. The S-2
uses the commander's PIR/IR to prepare the task force surveillance plan.
The S-3 uses the surveillance plan to complement the standard proce-
dures that the task force uses when conducting a screen. The S-3 issues
a counterreconnaissance plan that provides all units of the task force
with specific information collection and surveillance requirements. The
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specific requirements complement the standard information needs of the
task force commander and staff.
The task force Fire Support Element (FSE) ensures that the
screening force is provided with responsive artillery, mortar, and close air
fire support. The task force FSO uses the S-2's IPB to develop a fire sup-
port plan that adequately covers the area in which the screening force
must operate. The FSO ensures that supporting artillery batteries are
able to fire at least three to five kilometers forward of the screening force
[Ref. 6:p. 12].
b. Information Processing
The S-2 uses the observations of the screening force to
identify the elements of the enemy reconnaissance effort. The S-2 uses
the information provided by the screen to determine the possible location
of the enemy force's main body and the avenue of approach that the
enemy is most likely to use when attacking. The S-2 then reports his
conclusions to both the task force commander and the higher
headquarters.
The S-3 uses information from the screening force to deter-
mine whether any enemy reconnaissance elements have infiltrated
through gaps that might exist in the task force screen. The S-3 monitors
reports from the screening force to determine whether it is necessary to
direct other elements of the task force to assist in the destruction of the
enemy reconnaissance. Both the S-3 and S-2 are responsible for forward-
ing reports from the screening force to the higher headquarters.
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c. Decision Makers
As in the reconnaissance task, the task force commander is
the primary decision maker and the XO, S-2, S-3, and FSO are second-
ary decision makers. The commander works closely with the S-3 to direct
the effort of the screening force against the enemy commander's recon-
naissance effort. The commander determines the PIR/IR for the screening
force. The commander directs the screening force to maneuver along
preplanned routes to positions behind the task force prior to the arrival
of the enemy main body.
The task force XO supervises the actions of the staff during
the screen mission. As the 2IC, the XO can make decisions that affect the
coordination of staff support to the screening force. He also has some
decision-making authority within each staff section. Within respective
sections, each staff officer is responsible for making decisions that pro-
vide support to the screening force as it executes the screen task.
d. Coordinating Mechanisms
Mutual adjustment exists among the staff elements to
ensure that they coordinate their support to the screening force (inter-
unit task interdependence). The FSO develops a fire support plan for the
screening force based on the S-2's IPB and the commander's intent [Ref.
6:p. 12]. The S-3 and FSO coordinate to determine when it is appropriate
to use indirect fires against the enemy's reconnaissance elements. Coor-
dination is necessary to preclude the wasting of these resources as well
as the possibility of fratricide.
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The S-3 uses the S-2's IPB and the commander's PIR/IR to
finalize the counterreconnaissance plan and determine the locations of
the surveillance force's observation posts and surveillance sites as well as
the reaction force's IFVs and tanks. The S-3 must ensure that there are
enough assets to fulfill the commander's intent and PIR/IR. The S-3
works with the task force XO to reduce variety by ensuring that task
force support assets are positioned well forward to facilitate resupply of
the screening force as well as casualty, equipment, and prisoner of war
evacuation.
D. SUMMARY
Counterreconnaissance is not a mission that the task force com-
mander can interpret in order to determine its uncertainty and thus an
appropriate corresponding command and control structure. Instead, it is
an accumulation of many tasks of which the screen is the most impor-
tant. Analysis of the screen mission reveals a task that is relatively
routine, requires minimal information processing capacity, has a stable
environment, and is subsequently low in uncertainty. The task force is
able to standardize the task processes around functional requirements
(surveillance and killing of enemy reconnaissance) because of task ana-
lyzability and low uncertainty.
The commander combines elements of the task force that are capa-
ble of fulfilling the functional requirements of the screen task into a sin-
gle force— the screening force. A dedicated surveillance force and reaction
force are responsible for conducting standardized operations that enable
the task force to defeat the enemy reconnaissance effort. The surveillance
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force and reaction force coordinate the execution of the screen through
shared information and mutual adjustment.
The task force headquarters organization provides direction to the
screening force. The commander's intent provides specific guidance to
the screening force, and the S-3 uses the intent to develop a counterre-
connaissance plan for the task force. The plan should only complement
the standard procedures that the task force uses when executing a
screen. The staff must coordinate through mutual adjustment to ensure




A commander who can concentrate superior combat power at deci-
sive times and places is often the winner of battles. While there is no
simple formula for success on the battlefield, the extent of information
known about the enemy and area of operations has long been recognized
as a critical factor in combat operations at any level. A commander con-
ducts reconnaissance in order to obtain information about the enemy
and area of operations. This information enables him to successfully
direct the combat power of his forces against enemy vulnerabilities and
along the most suitable maneuver routes.
A task force performs counterreconnaissance to deny this type of
information to the enemy commander. The task force screen is the pri-
mary instrument available to the task force commander to deny enemy
reconnaissance forces the ability to gather information about the task
force. The screening force gathers information about the enemy recon-
naissance forces and uses this information to destroy the enemy forces
before they can enter the task force area of operations.
Timely and accurate information is essential at the tactical level of
operations. This is especially evident within the U.S. Army armor and
mechanized infantry task force. The speed and maneuverability of
mechanized forces require the task force to gather, analyze, and dissemi-
nate information (information processing) as quickly and efficiently as
possible. The task force must have a command and control structure
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that facilitates organizational information processing and coordinates
task force elements as they conduct reconnaissance or
counterreconnaissance.
The task force commander and staff must design a command and
control structure that supports the commander's decision-making pro-
cess and reduces the uncertainty that they experience as the task force
conducts reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. The commander
and staff conduct a task analysis of reconnaissance to determine where
and to what degree uncertainty exists. The task analysis analyzes the
task in terms of its characteristics, environment, inter-unit interdepen-
dence, and technology. The uncertainty that exists in each area deter-
mines how the commander will structure and coordinate the forces that
he intends to devote to reconnaissance.
Reconnaissance is a task that is high in uncertainty. Unanalyzable
technology, the need for significant information processing capacity, and
high inter-unit task interdependence require a command and control
structure that uses direct supervision, mutual adjustment, and common
information sharing to coordinate the reconnaissance effort. The com-
mander and staff assemble task force assets that are most suitable to
conduct specific reconnaissance subtasks due to high task complexity
and variety. By limiting the number and scope of reconnaissance sub-
tasks that certain task force elements must accomplish and by promot-
ing mutual problem solving through mutual adjustment, the commander
and staff create a structure that reduces uncertainty to a manageable
level and improves the reconnaissance effort.
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Unlike reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance is not a task for
which the commander and staff can design a command and control
structure. Counterreconnaissance is the aggregation of all measures
taken by the task force to defeat the enemy reconnaissance effort. The
task force screen, the most important aspect of counterreconnaissance,
is a task that the commander and staff can analyze in order to determine
its associated degree of uncertainty. A stable environment and low task
variety portray the low uncertainty of the screen task.
The screen task is typically reduced to two manageable subtasks:
detecting and destroying the enemy reconnaissance elements. Conse-
quently, the screen task is relatively routine and requires minimal infor-
mation-processing capacity. The commander and staff configure the
screening force in accordance with its functional subtasks— surveillance
and combating of enemy reconnaissance elements. A surveillance force
detects enemy reconnaissance assets and provides the enemy location(s)
to the task force headquarters and the reaction force on a common radio
frequency. The reaction force uses the information from the surveillance
force to locate and destroy the enemy reconnaissance elements.
Standardization is suitable as a means for coordinating the efforts of
the surveillance and reaction forces due to low task complexity and
information-processing requirements. While standardization and com-
monly shared information adequately coordinate the effort of the two
forces, some mutual adjustment may be necessary.
The function of the task force headquarters is essentially the same
for both reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. The task force
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headquarters provides direction to the reconnaissance and screening
forces through the commander's intent, rules of engagement, and plans
and orders. The headquarters is responsible for synchronizing the
actions of the task force elements that support the reconnaissance and
screening forces.
As the headquarters receives information from the reconnaissance
and screening forces, the staff sections must interact to ensure that the
surveillance, maneuver, and supporting indirect fire elements of the task
force are synchronized. Mutual adjustment between the task force S-2
and S-3 allow them to confirm threat estimates and formulate schemes of
maneuver that take into consideration enemy dispositions, enemy and
friendly routes of maneuver, and the effect of terrain and weather on
operations. Using mutual adjustment, the S-2, S-3, and FSO coordinate
to ensure that supporting indirect fires can effectively fire well forward of
reconnaissance or screening forces. The S-2 and FSO must also coordi-
nate to prevent the possibility of fratricide from indirect fires by estab-
lishing restricted fire areas for reconnaissance and screening forces. The
S-3 and FSO use the S-2's Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield to
develop initial operations plans for upcoming operations.
The task force executive officer and commander provide direction to
the staff during reconnaissance and, to a lesser degree, counterrecon-
naissance. The executive officer supervises the actions of the entire staff
to ensure that the reconnaissance and screening forces receive the nec-
essary administrative, operational, and logistical support. As the second
in command of the task force and by virtue of his location in the task
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force headquarters, the executive officer can make decisions for elements
within the task force headquarters organization. It is the commander,
however, who provides all task force elements with planning guidance,
tactical intent, and operational maneuver instructions. The commander
is ultimately responsible for determining the proper combination of task
force assets and coordinating mechanisms necessary to execute the task
force reconnaissance and screen tasks. The commander must work with
his staff to determine a command and control architecture for the task
force that maximizes information processing capacity within the unit and
enables him to use the processed information to successfully direct the
combat power of the task force against the enemy.
The command and control architectures in this thesis are a result of
the independent analysis of two very dissimilar tasks. The author uses
his intuition, training, and research to design a distinct architecture for
reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. Future research should con-
centrate on calculating the actual number of surveillance and combat
elements of the task force that would maximize information gathering
and processing capacity while retaining maximum combat power for the
task force mission. It might be possible to model and analyze various
architectures using different combinations of scouts, GSRs, engineers,
and combat vehicles. This would require the researcher to determine
measures of effectiveness that quantify the uncertainty associated with
task variables (task characteristics, task environment, inter-unit task
interdependence, and technology) and coordinating mechanisms. The
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scope of this research is applicable to counterreconnaissance and recon-
naissance alike.
The reliance of the elements in the two architectures on radio com-
munications creates another area of concern that requires further
research. When conducting the reconnaissance and counterreconnais-
sance tasks, the task force uses radio networks that are subject to satu-
ration from excessive and redundant information processing as well as
from too many elements operating on the same frequency. It is also quite
possible that information delays due to enemy countermeasures or the
time required to analyze and process raw data into information may lead
to misleading or misinterpreted information by the task force commander
and staff. Computer simulations or PERT networks can determine the
feasibility of various radio network configurations. Data from training
exercises at the National Training Center might provide a realistic data-
base that could be used for determining the vulnerability of the com-
mand and control architecture to communication problems.
Lastly, many of the factors that are used in a task analysis are also
used in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. The Commander's
Estimate of the Situation determines the effects of several mission fac-
tors, thus enabling the commander to determine a course of action that
is best suited to the characteristics of the mission. Many of the principles
of task analysis might be incorporated into the Commander's Estimate of
the Situation in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the
area of operations and the enemy. With this additional analysis, the
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